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ABSTRACT /
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the 
events leading up to the Bay of Pigs debacle to determine 
how a venture so greatly misconceived came to be approved. 
The study gives attention to the beginnings of the exile 
brigade in the Eisenhower administration, how the election 
campaign influenced its growth, and the evolution and com­
mitment in the Kennedy administration.
The procedure involved a review of the historical 
backgrounds, an objective chronicle of the disaster, and 
a look at the national and midwest reaction and response.
The study is based on accounts written by those who par­
ticipated in decision making, press interviews with members 
of the invasion force, and on-the-spot stories as related in 
books, newspapers, and magazines.
The results emphasize some of the inherent weaknesses 
of our system of government and how virtually impossible it 
is to engage in operations of this size and keep them secret 
in an open society.
In conclusion, Cuba is a dramatic demonstration of the 
ineptness of United States Latin-American policies or lack 
of policies; a demonstration also of prevailing American at­
titudes to any revolutionary change. The concept of trying 
to impose a right-wing government on Cuba that would imme­





When Columbus discovered Cuba, in the course of his 
first voyage, on Sunday October 28, llj.92, he was so im­
pressed, he said: "It is the most beautiful land human eyes 
have ever seen." The island was one of Spain's first foot­
holds in the new world, remained a Spanish colony for lj.00 
years, and was the last colony to gain its independence.
Cuba has been dominated by foreign power almost from the 
time of Columbus. After it was lost to Spain it fell under 
the shadow of the United States, and is now, under Castro, 
thought to be the target of communist takeover.
Diego Velasquez, with a force of 300 men, began the 
conquest of the island in 13>11. It was first used by the 
Spaniards as a stepping stone to wider discoveries in the 
New World, and following the period of explorations, it be­
came a base of supplies for the Spanish fleet moving to and 
from the New World. A plantation economy to supply local 
needs and also provisions for the ships that called created 
a need for a large labor supply. The rapid destruction of 
the Indians made necessary the importation of slave labor, 
which began in 15>22. It was this period also that saw the 
beginnings of the large sugar plantation which soon ruled 
the island and became both a curse and a blessing to it
1
2
in the years that followed.
Almost from its beginning as an independent nation,
the United States has looked longingly at Cuba. The early
>
sense of Manifest Destiny, beginning with the purchase of 
Louisiana in 1803 and the acquisition of Florida in 1819, 
created an appetite for ever-expanding frontiers, and the 
conviction grew that Cuba must some day be included in the 
Union of States.
Jefferson was the first to describe a Latin-American 
policy when he suggested the exclusion of European influ­
ence from this hemisphere. What he probably had in mind 
was the exclusion of Spain's authority and the substitution 
of United States sovereignty in Cuba as well as Florida.
The No-transfer Resolution of l8ll stated that no part of 
Florida territory should pass into the hands of a foreign 
power. In 1823 John Quincy Adams extended this to include 
Cuba.3
England and France, fearing United States ambitions, 
proposed in 18^2 a tripartite agreement that the three pow­
ers "severally and collectively disclaim, now and for here­
after, all intention to obtain possession of the Island of
iHubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the 
Beginnings to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
19jj3>), PP« 393-96 passim.
^Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of 




Cuba." Secretary of State Edward Everett in his famous 
reply disclaimed for his government any coveting of Cuba 
but refused to bind the United States against ever ac­
quiring the Pearl of the Antilles:
The United States . . . would . . . disable them­
selves from making an acquisition which might take 
place without any disturbance of existing foreign 
relations, and in the natural order of things.
The island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands 
the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes 
the shores of five of our States. It bars the en­
trance of that great river which drains half the 
North American continent, . . .  It keeps watch at 
the door-way of our intercourse with California 
and the Isthmus route.h-
The islands closeness to the United States, and the possi­
bility of its fine harbors being used by enemy navies to 
threaten the nation’s commerce was the reason for its early 
interest. With the expanding commerce with Cuba, and be­
cause of its strategic position in respect to the Panama 
Canal, United States felt the need to secure a naval base 
there.
When other Spanish colonies declared their indepen­
dence of Spain early in the nineteenth century, despite 
its discontent and restiveness, Cuba did not. Failure to 
move for freedom was in part a lack of effective aid from 
the outside and in part a lack of agreement among Cubans 
themselves as to what they wanted--autonomy within the Spa­
nish Empire, annexation with the United States, or com­
plete independence. As time went on, desire for inde­
pendence increased, especially as Spanish repressive
4̂-Ibid., p . 96.
measures increased. In 1837 Spain excluded Cuban deputies 
from the Spanish cortes and said Cuba would now be governed 
by "special laws."
Into this scene was injected the desire on the part 
many United States groups to annex Cuba. Proslavery ele­
ments, especially, wanted the island to offset the growing 
power of the antislavery forces in the United States Cong­
ress. Preebooting expeditions originating on the mainland
were attempted. Narciso Lopez, a Venezuelan who had fought
/under the Spanish flag against Bolivar, later moved to Cuba 
where he shifted to the patriot side against the mother 
country. He was forced to flee to the United States where 
he recruited three filibustering invasions to the island-- 
in l8Ij.8, 1850, and l85l; all failed and Lopez was caught 
and garroted as a traitor.-'
Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan tried in vain to 
purchase Cuba from Spain. A secret offer of $100 million 
was made, but Spain angrily rejected it. The American 
ministers to Spain, Prance, and England then contrived to­
gether and issued the Ostend Manifesto, which announced 
American intention either to buy Cuba or to take it "with­
out consent of Spain.
^Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United 
States, p . 95•
^Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of 
a Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), p . 12 
This is a study of the Castro Revolution by the co-editors 
of the socialist Monthly Review.
Sporadic revolts continued and increased and in 1868 
Cubans rose in armed rebellion, contending that Cuba "nat­
urally belonged" to the Cubans. For ten years the Cuban 
struggle for independence, with declining vigor, kept the 
island in confusion. War ended in 1878 when Spain made 
promises of sweeping government reforms, amnesty for poli­
tical prisoners, liberty for rebel slaves, abolition of 
slavery, and representation in the cortes.7 Eighty thou­
sand Spanish soldiers died and a half a billion dollars was 
spent by the mother country, as a result of Spain's failure 
to bring badly needed reforms to Cuba. Much of the Cuban 
countryside was laid waste, representing complete loss to 
the farmers, and some American merchants who had financed 
Cuban sugar estates picked up additional properties at 
advantageous prices.®
The struggle for political freedom continued. The
/ fCuban people, spurred on by the writings of Jose Marti, re­
belled again in l895--a continuation of the Ten Years War. 
Spain dispatched more than 200,000 men to Cuba under the 
command of General Valeriano Wyler, who earned for himself 
the epithet of el carnicero, the butcher. Several thousand 
men, women, and children were herded into concentration 
camps, where inadequate food and lack of sanitation brought
?Jenks, Leland Hamilton, Our Cuban Colony (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928), pp. 13-17.
O
°Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution
p . 12.
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death to many thousands and also brought the sympathy of 
the American people, who clamored for intervention.
In 1898 when the battleship Maine was blown up in
Havana harbor, United States public opinion demanded war
against Spain. Many forces provoked American intervention:
American investments wanted their profits protected; the
pending Isthmian Canal made it unwise to leave Spain in
control of the island that dominated the Caribbean; Hearst
and Pulitzer, in an effort to sell papers, sold the war to
9the American public.
Spanish rule ceased on December 10, 1898, and was fol­
lowed immediately by United States military rule. A stable 
government was established, yellow fever eradicated, the 
island economy bolstered, great new public facilities con­
structed. America generously provided, but neglected to 
provide what Cubans wanted most--independence. A Cuban 
Constitutional Convention met and adopted a constitution on 
February 21, 1901; the American Congress met and adopted 
the Platt Amendment and demanded that it be a part of the 
Cuban Constitution. Herring said: "Cuba was now free--but 
not free to make her own mistakes. That was the meaning 
implicit in the Platt Amendment, under whose protection, or 
threat, Cuba lived for thirty-two years."* 10 American troops
°Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution,
p . 13.
10Herring, A History of Latin America, p. l\.00.
intervened under the Amendment for the first time in 1906, 
a second time in 1912, and a third time in 1917* In 1920 
American political and financial advisors controlled the /
Cuban government without benefit of troops.
Cuba is rich in many resources, but sugar has always 
dominated the island. In the l880’s and 1890's American 
investment in sugar plantations greatly increased, by 1896 
it was valued at $30 million. Investments were not con­
fined to this one industry however: Bethlehem Steel and 
Rockefeller interests invested heavily in mining proper­
ties. By 1896 American investments in Cuba totaled 
million. In 1903? a reciprocity treaty approved by Con­
gress, gave Cuban imports a tariff reduction of 20 percent, 
and American products going into Cuba a like amount. This 
meant that American refiners could buy Cuban sugar cheaper 
than the price on the open market, and made it possible, 
through increased demand, for Cuban sugar producers to 
expand their output. The import rates into Cuba gave Amer­
ican farmers and manufacturers advantages over other coun­
tries. This distortion of free enterprise made Cuba depen­
dent on American imports instead of developing her own 
11resources
During the First World War, a shortage of sugar re­
sulted in tremendous profit and expansion in the industry.
■^Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, pp. 31-35 passim.
7
8
In the aftermath, however, as prices went down to an all-
time low, sugar millowners could not repay their loans to
the banks; banks could not pay their depositors and were
forced to close. The large Cuban banks, the Banco Nacional
and the Banco Espanol, were taken over by the National City
Bank of New York. By the 1950’s Americans owned 90 percent
of the telephone and electric services, 50 percent of the
public service railroads, and about ipO percent of the raw
sugar production. American capital dominated the islands 
12economy.
/In 1902 Tomas Estrada Palma became the first presi­
dent of the new republic. Huberman and Sweezy described 
the years that followed:
There came a succession of Presidents whose terms 
were characterized by venality, nepotism, incom­
petence, graft, and despotism. Some were elected 
to office by ballots, others seized or held power 
by bullets. Two^of the better of, a thoroughly bad 
lot were Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin and Dr. Carlos 
Prio Socarras; two of the^worst, General Gerardo 
Machado and Sergeant Fulge'ncio Batista, . . were
bloody dictators whose regimes were nightmares of 
repression, assassination, gangsterism, bribery, 
and corrupt ion .13
As a result of violent political agitation and charges
/ ✓of corruption against Carlos Prio Soccarras, Batista over-
/threw the government and sent Prio into exile. He closed 
Congress and called for elections in 195̂ 4-, and was elected
l^Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution, 
pp. 11-19; Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Carib­
bean (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966),
pp. 31-35.
p. 17.
^Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution,
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without opposition for a four-year term. Batista ruled by 
the grace of the army but was also a shrewd politician.
Aware of the middle-class Cubans desire for public office 
he used patronage to gain their support. He won the sup­
port of organized labor by improving wages and working con­
ditions. When opposition developed among the intellectuals, 
Batista was so well-entrenched behind the backing of the 
military, the middle-class officeholders, and organized 
labor, he could face it without fear. The last years of 
Batista's regime, particularly from 195b to 1959, were 
marked by growing repression, terrorism, and violent repris­
als against growing strength of anti-Batista forces who 
organized a campaign of harassment in the provinces.
Ray Brennan, reporter for the Chicago Sun-Times, pre­
sented some disturbing facts about the Batista regime. "For 
five years or more the six million people of Cuba were to 
know the whiplash of cruel oppression. About nineteen thou­
sand of them were murdered. . . . The tortures and mutila­
tions were almost beyond belief." Strict censorship kept 
a closed lid on the news. Reporters heard of atrocitios but 
could not prove them. However, Arthur Gardner and his suc­
cessor, Earl T. Smith, United States ambassadors to Cuba, 
who were frequent guests of the dictator and had consular 
officials reporting to them from the interior of Cuba,". . . 
could not have avoided hearing of the hellish conditions, .
. . It was certainly the ambassadors' duty to report fully
10
to the State Department if they knew about it."-*-̂
Batista's dictatorship was illegal, yet, the United
States sold warplanes, bombs, guns, and ammunition, that,
were being used by a tyrant to kill his subjects. On
August 26, 1958, Miro Cardona wrote a letter to Eisenhower
asking him to withdraw help to Batista, particularly to stop
sending arms and ammunition. The reply when it came stated:
The United States believes in the democratic 
election process and the choice by the people, 
through free and fair election or democratic 
government responsive to them. . . .  At the 
same time United States does follow a strict 
policy of nonintervention in domestic affairs 
of sister republics. . . . The military equip­
ment supplied by the United States to Cuba was 
in the interest of hemispheric defense.^5
The attack on Batista’s dictatorship began among uni­
versity students. On July 26, 1953? a rebel army of some 
200 men, mostly young students, stormed the Moncada army 
barracks in Santiago. About half of them were killed by 
machine gun fire, others were captured, horribly tortured, 
then put in jail to wait trial--among them, their leader 
Fidel Castro and his brother Raul. It was a continuation 
of the revolution that began in 1868.
Fidel Castro was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, 
but eleven months later, under the pressure of public
-*-̂ -Ray Brennan, Castro, Cuba and Justice (New York: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), p . 26. The story is based 
on first hand information, including data obtained by the 
author when he was with Castro and his rebels in Sierra 
Maestra mountains and in the underground.
-*-^Hub
p. 17.
erman and Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution.
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opinion, amnesty was granted. In July, 1955* Fidel went to 
Mexico to gather arms and men for an invasion of Cuba, and 
on December 2, 1956, he landed with 82 men on the south­
eastern coast. Most of the men were shot by a Batista army 
troop, but about a dozen, including Fidel, his brother Raul, 
and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine-born physician who 
had spent a good part of his life fighting against dictator­
ship in Argentina and later in Guatemala, escaped into the 
Sierra Maestra."^
The next two years saw the development of the resist­
ance movement that was to topple Batista. In Brennan's 
words: "The word spread through Oriente Province. The
Rebels were good, kind men. If they obtained food from a 
farmer they paid for it. If they had no money they went 
hungry. . . . The fidelistas became heroes, almost gods, to 
the countryfolk. " ^  Theodore Draper gives this account:
. . . as the months passed the relations be­
tween the Rebels and the peasants took a new 
dimension. The crying poverty, illiteracy, dis­
ease, and primitivism of the outcast peasants 
appalled the young city-bred ex-students. Out 
of this came a determination to revolutionize 
Cuban society, raising the lowest and most
^Herbert L. Matthews, The Cuban Story (New York: 
George Braziller, Inc., 1961), pp. 15-i+ij passim. This book 
is the result of a secret interview in the Sierra Maestra, 
in spite of the vigilance of Batista's troops, between 
Matthews, a New York Times reporter, and Fidel Castro.
-^Brennan, Castro, Cuba and Justice, pp. 127-28.
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neglected sector to a civilized level of well­being and human dignity.
In the months to follow these guajiros, or farmfolk, were 
to have a mighty part in turning back Batista's army and'' 
in winning the victory that came on New Year's day, 1959, 
as the overthrown dictator, Batista and his family, sought 
asylum in Santo Domingo.
The victory of the Left in Cuba was the natural out­
come of years of social and economic discontent. Was it 
from the beginning a communist movement? Did it become 
communist when the United States used "economic" pressure 
against it, and forced it to turn elsewhere for help? Is 
it now communist, or simply a people's social and economic 
revolution based on Marxist principles? These were the 
questions that brought about the aberration called the 
"Bay of Pigs."
xoTheodore Draper, Castro's Revolution (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p . 11.
CHAPTER II <
Chronicle of Disaster
The story begins on March 17, I960, whon it appeared
to the Eisenhower administration that Fidel Castro had sold
out to the communists, bringing in the Soviet Union and Red
China as full partners in the Cuban Revolution. It had
also become apparent that Latin America was reluctant to
1act against Castro.
Cuban exiles arriving in Miami in ever greater num­
bers were seeking support for means of overthrowing Castro. 
The administration, influenced by the course of events in
Cuba and the growing pressure of the refugees for action,
2agreed to help organize a force of Cuban exiles. No- one 
knew what was about to take place in Cuba, but a well- 
trained cadre of guerrillas would be useful if conditions 
warranted their use.
^"Hell of a Beating in Cuba," Life, April 28, 1961,
p. 17-
2Theodore Draper, "Cuba and United States Policy,"
The New Leader, June 5, 1961, p. 11.
-^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John 
F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1965), p. 226.
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The implementation of the decision to organize a 
Cuban brigade, which required the greatest secrecy, was
entrusted to the Central Intelligence Agency. It was di-/
vided into two parts: On the political side it directed 
the CIA to bring together a broad range of Cuban exiles, 
with batistianos (followers of Pulgencio Batista) and ex­
iles professing communist ideology specifically excluded, 
into unified political opposition to the Castro regime. On 
the military side it authorized the CIA to train and equip 
a Cuban guerrilla force that might be used against Castro.^- 
Overall command was given to Allen W. Dulles, di­
rector of CIA. Mr. Dulles began his service during the 
First World War under Woodrow Wilson. During the Eisen­
hower administration, his brother was Secretary of State 
and his agency had become increasingly involved in hand­
ling political operations without supervision. He was to 
have general supervision but the day-to-day responsibility 
was given to one of the deputies in the CIA, Richard 
Bissell, Jr. Both men were experienced in intelligence 
work, mostly in Europe, but never in Latin America. Nei­
ther had ever commanded troops.-^
^Ibid.
q-̂ Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p . 77• The 
authors followed the Cuban Revolution from its first days 
and knew most of the leaders whose decisions played a 
part in the story, so they had much first-hand informa­
tion to draw upon.
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The first migration of Cubans coming to this country,
numbering only a few thousand, had all been batistianos.
These were completely without support in Cuba. Then came
the frightened rich, persons who had served neither Ba-
£tista or Castro. According to Schlesinger, these "were 
characteristically identified with the old Cuba of the tra­
ditional parties, of progressive intent and ineffectual 
performance. Some were decent men; others were racketeers 
who had found politics a lucrative way of life."^ Follow­
ing these came, also representing the political right, 
businessmen, teachers, professionals, and intellectuals. 
They stood for the Cuba of the past.
It was to such men that the CIA turned when it be­
gan to organize the political front in the early months of 
I960. There were almost as many groups and factions as 
there were Cuban refugees. In June, five of the leading
groups were asked to form the Frente Revolucionario Demo-
/ 8cratico, which became known as the Frente. Out of this
group was chosen a directorate of five members. Three of 
these represented pre-Batista Cuba: Manuel Antonio Varona, 
a former premier who had served in the government of Presi­
dent Carlos Prio Socarras (the man Batista overthrew in *8
/Draper, "Cuba and United States Policy," The New 
Leader, June 5? 1961, p. 6.
"^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 277-
8Ibid.
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1952); Dr. Justo Carillo, a man of liberal views, who had
been president of the Bank for Industrial and Agricultural
/Development under both Prio and Castro and had been foreign
' /minister in one of Prio's cabinets, and Aureliano Sanchez
Arango, who had been Minister of Education. The other two 
were Jose/ Ignacio Rasco, a courageous young man who had led 
the small Christian Democratic party in Cuba, and a young 
lieutenant named Manuel Artime Buesa, who had joined Castro 
at the end of 1958 and later worked for Castro's National
QInstitute of Agrarian Reform.
This man Artime, who was to play such an important 
role in the counterrevolution, was in many respects an 
unlikely candidate for a political role. He was twenty- 
eight, had a degree as a medical doctor, and was trained as 
a psychiatrist.10 He was chief of the exile section of the 
Movement of Revolutionary Recovery (MRR), a secret organ­
ization composed of former rebel army officers. He was the 
only one of the five men on the directorate who could claim 
any important connections with the Cuban underground.
Soon after he broke with the regime in November 1959, the
I ICIA brought him out of Cuba. Meyer and Szulc in The
^Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs (New York: ¥. W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 1965), p . 307 This is the story as 
told by four of the brigade leaders after they were freed 
from Cuban prisons.
1QIbid.
llnBitter Week: The Cuban Invasion," Time, April 28
1961, p. 11.
17
Cuban Invasion said: "His youth, his military experience,
his political inexperience and his personal tractability
12all recommended him to the CIA field operatives." He /
became their man in the Frente and was soon the only link 
between the CIA's political and military operations.
The Frente was well named; it was a front and noth­
ing else. No sooner had the pact been signed than it was 
followed by dissension among its members. Meyer and Szulc 
felt from the outset "an unhealthy dependence on the CIA 
characterized the organization." It was provided with a 
headquarters building on Miami's Biscayne Boulevard and an 
office at Coral Gables. In addition, "The CIA paid the
salary of many of the officials and invested money in its
13newspapers and propaganda activities."
While the members of the Frente sat quibbling, the 
CIA was busy recruiting refugees in Florida and Central 
America, and persuaded President Ydigoras of Guatemala to 
allow the use of land near the mountains of his country for 
an air base and a secret training camp. By late July work­
ers began preparing an air strip in Guatemala to serve the 
rebel air force that was needed for supply missions flown 
to the Cuban underground. The first CIA plan was to form 
small groups that would slip into Cuba where there were al­
ready active centers of resistance, and arms and supplies 123
12Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 26.
13Ibid., p. 27.
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would be flown in. These groups would enlarge themselves 
until they had enough popular support for an uprising. The 
long-range planning called for use of the same planes to
1
land commando groups in Cuba when the uprising began.
By midsummer other Cubans began to arrive in Guat­
emala. It was the rainy season and they had to build their 
own camp in sticky, volcanic mud five thousand feet above 
the sea. In their spare time, they received training from 
a Filipino colonel who had been in charge of guerrilla 
fighting against the Japanese in World War II. In August 
I960 Eisenhower approved a budget of $13 million for the 
Cuban project. According to Schlesinger, it was stipu­
lated that "no United States military personnel were to 
take part in combat operations .
Meyer and Szulc call attention to a powerful new un­
derground movement that had come into being in Cuba. Sev­
eral hundred guerrillas were hiding out in the Escambray 
Mountains, and an American-trained young Cuban engineer 
Manuel Ray, who had been a member of Castro's cabinet but 
resigned when the moderates were being purged by the radi­
cals, was now activating his underground in the cities.
This underground movement which was given the name People's 
Revolutionary Movement (MRP) was a model of its kind. The 
network spanned the entire island, with an executive coun­
cil in each province and lesser commands reaching down to 
the smallest village. The combination of the Escambray
•^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 228.
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guerrillas and the MRP underground in the cities became the 
most important anti-regime operations in Cuba. These men 
had in mind "restoring the revolution to its original /
goals," said Andrew Tully, "and to continue the social 
reforms Castro had initiated.
The CIA strategists had little patience with the un­
derground, but because of its stubborness and persistence 
it could not be ignored. Plans were belatedly made to give 
assistance. The rebel aircraft began flying occasional 
supply missions over the Escambray Mountains, dropping sup­
plies, but it was already too little and too late. Under 
Castro’s pressure the resistance in the mountains eventu­
ally collapsed, leaving the MRP as the principal anti- 
Castro movement in Cuba. It was also having trouble, and 
Manuel Ray realized that if he were going to keep his re­
sistance group going he would have to have more United 
States help. He arranged to have himself smuggled into 
Miami in November I960 to plead his case in person.
While the neglected groups within Cuba suffered from 
lack of supplies and direction a deep division became ap­
parent in the forces being trained by the CIA. Artime, the 
favorite leader, was edging farther over to the right-wing 
groups, while Ray, who according to Szulc, favored "a *16
Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, 1962), P* 21|5.
16)Tad Szulc, "Cuba: Anatomy of a Failure," Look,
July 18, 1961, p. 76.
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democratic anti-communist Cuba, as Castro had promised
. . . was being subjected to a smear campaign, labeling him
a 'dangerous leftist.'"17 *1920 CIA men were aware of these at-
tacks; they knew the high command was opposed to giving
support to anyone too far to the left, consequently, Ray
, 18received no help.
New waves of refugees continued coming out of Cuba. 
This was now the third migration, led by men who had con­
spired against Batista and fought with Castro in the rev­
olutionary army, and who, like Ray and the MRPs, left when 
Castro allegedly turned his social revolution into commu­
nism. These men were politically radical and nationalist, 
personally proud and defiant. Their thesis was that Castro
had to be overthrown from within and that the Cuban people
19must be the means. y
These groups were serious rivals of the people on the
right who had arrived earlier and who condemned anyone who
had ever belonged to the movement, and especially anyone who
had occupied a post of some responsibility in the Castro
government. These controversies were of great importance:
whether the underground in Cuba or the exiles in the United
POStates should lead in the struggle against Castro.
17Ibid.
•^Tully, CIA: The Inside Story, p. 21\S.
19Schle singer, A Thousand Days, p. 231.
20Draper, "Cuba and United States Policy," New Leader, 
June 1961.
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In the early stages of planning the project, the CIA 
had chosen as their Miami manager and main contact with 
exile leaders a man by the name of Prank Bender, whose real 
name was Droller, a German refugee who had come to this 
country before the war and moved up into army intelligence. 
He knew little about Cuba or Latin America and spoke no 
Spanish, but, as Meyer and Szulc stated, he had money and 
authority, and fell naturally into the role of command.
The new power went to his head--he regarded himself the 
most important leader in the counterrevolution. The older 
exiles disliked and feared him, but they felt they had no 
choice but to obey him.^l
When Bender ordered Ray and his underground movement 
to join the Frente, he met with refusal. This group posed 
a threat to the more conservative exiles who did everything 
to discredit them. They denounced Ray as fidelisimo sin 
Fidel--Castroism without Castro. During the opening months 
of 1961 CIA was beginning to have trouble with all groups.
Senior Sanchez Arango, one of the five members of the 
directorate, stated: "The CIA wanted to control everything 
. . . . The members who were . . . .  willing to accept 
their commands, their orders, their provisions, were the 
ones in best relationship with them." Manuel Artime 21
21 Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 19.
22Clifton Daniels, "Pull Story of Bay of Pigs,"
New York Times, June 2, 1966, p. 11.
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Buesa was chosen to lead because he was willing to accept 
all their demands. He was a one-time Castro soldier who
had served Pidel briefly as an official in an Agrarian Re-/
form Zone in Oriente. He had very little military experi­
ence but was an accomplished orator and his political phil­
osophy was basically conservative, which appealed to the
23 yCIA. Sanchez Arango argued that the Frente should take 
in people with a revolutionary background. Refusing to do 
this and favoring "reliable" exiles, who would take orders, 
the CIA endangered the whole project, because the men most 
capable of rallying support within Cuba against Castro were 
being left out.^
Months had passed since November I960 when President 
Eisenhower had approved the forming of a Cuban exile brig-
lade. The manner in which it was to function had not yet 
been definitely decided. By the closing days of the presi­
dential campaign of I960 Cuba had become not only the domi­
nant issue in the United States but also internationally. 
Castro had announced recognition of Red China, torn up a 
1952 military pact with the United States, and was seeking 
support from Russia and China. Castro called the United 
States a "vulture feeding on humanity." He dared the United 
States to attack and be destroyed, repeatedly charging that 
the "Yankee Imperialists" were training for invasion. The
2^Tully, CIA: The Inside Story, p. 21+6.
^Daniels, "Full Story of Bay of Pigs," New York 
Times, June 2, 1966, p. 11.
Cuban Minister to United Nations, Raul Roa, demanded an im­
mediate meeting of the Security Council to prevent armed
groups of the United States and mercenaries at their ser-/
vice from invading Cuba.^
President Kennedy, who had not yet been briefed on 
the Guatemala activity, said in a campaign speech: "We 
must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic 
forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual 
hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus far these fighters for 
freedom have had virtually no support from our government.” 
Richard Nixon, who was aware of the existence of the Guate­
malan camp and the United States plans for it, replied: "I 
think that Senator Kennedy's policies and recommendations 
for handling the Castro regime are probably the most danger­
ously irresponsible recommendations that he has made during 
the course of the campaign." He believed that Kennedy's 
call for a support of a revolution in Cuba was "the most 
shockingly reckless proposal ever made. . . by a presiden­
tial candidate.
While the CIA was working with the counterrevolution­
ary forces, the overall planning was debated in Washington 
by a special group. These were high level officials from 
the Pentagon, the State Department, the CIA, and the White 
House. According to Haynes Johnson, the original plan for
^The Minneapolis Tribune, January 1, 1961, p. 1+.
26]3aynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. SO.
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a guerrilla operation was scrapped for three reasons:
First, it became apparent that supplying the 
guerrillas by air drops, as was planned, would 
be extremely difficult; second, as Castro became 
more openly allied with the Communist bloc, 
heavy shipments of arms and ammunition began 
arriving in Cuba; third, Castro's control over 
the civilians and militia was tighter than had 
been anticipated, making it difficult for even a 
long guerrilla campaign to succeed.27
From the original concept of isolated guerrilla landings, 
the plan now moved toward the idea of a larger operation 
that really amounted to an invasion.^® President Eisen­
hower was apparently unaware of what was going on. He 
later stated that guerrilla training was all that he had 
authorized.̂ 9
The CIA sent a long cable to Guatemala, informing the 
anti-Castro forces there of the change of plans. The guer­
rilla force was cut to sixty men, and a new training pro­
gram was instituted for the others. The change of plans 
met with good response from the Cubans, who turned with en­
thusiasm to the idea of an amphibious landing, and the new 
type of training and equipment gave them renewed hope. They 
were certain that those left behind in Cuba hated Castro as 
much as they did, so they genuinely believed that a mass
27Ibid., p. 53*
O°Thomas B. Ross and David Wise, The Invisible 
Government (Hew York: Random House, 1961+) , p3 29.
^ f . j. Cook, "The Case Builds Up," Nation, June 22,
1961+, p. 616.
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landing in Cuba might set off a general revolt. The Am­
erican officers assured them that they would have all the 
support they needed. Pepe San Ramon, a regular army officer 
who had served under a democratic regime, a dictatorship, 
and most recently and briefly under Fidel Castro said: "The 
American officers always referred to our part in the armed 
forces, or our part in the combat, . . . that this thing 
was much bigger and we were just a piece there--one of the 
most important pieces--but said there were many, many 
groups like ours, and they were all going to be under us.
We were only one tenth of the f o r c e . ( I t a l i c s  mine.)
As later events proved, the American officers had created 
a false impression.
On November 29, I960, Allen Dulles gave President­
elect Kennedy a detailed briefing on CIA's "new military 
conception." He listened with attention and decided to 
allow the preparation to go on for the time being. He
said: "There will be ample opportunity after the inau-
32guration for review and reconsideration."
During the next few weeks neither the outgoing nor 
the incoming administration wanted to make committments to 
any major decisions. Equipment and men continued to pour 
into Guatemala. An air base was established in Nicaragua *32
^°Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 232.
J Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 56.
32Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 233-
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from which bomb strikes, in advance of the attack, would 
knock out Castro's Air Force. Scores of Cuban doctors and 
nurses who had earlier volunteered for duty were notified 
to depart for a hospital ship that was being outfitted 
somewhere in Florida. Many other clandestine groups, some 
with bases in the swamps of Florida and Louisiana, others 
from Key West in the Florida Keys were organizing for 
action against Castro.
By this time the plans were no longer secret. The 
Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a pro-Castro group, asked 
Congress to investigate reports that the CIA was planning 
an invasion. The Nation reported on a trip made to Guate­
mala by Dr. Ronald Hilton, a Stanford University professor, 
who claimed the country was swarming with anti-Castro ex­
iles planning an invasion. It said the CIA was offering 
$25,000 for pilots to fly on this mission scheduled for 
sometime early in 1961. The Nation went on to say: "If
Washington is ignorant of the existence of the base, or is-e
innocent of any involvement in it, they should scotch all 
insidious rumors and issue a full statement of the facts or 
if it is true, then public pressure should be brought to 
bear upon the administration to abandon this dangerous and 
hair-brained |j3icj project.
The United States could not become involved in action 
against Cuba without violating the spirit and the letter of
^Editorial, Nation, November 19, I960, p. 50*
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the OAS charter, hemispheric treaties, United Nations 
pledge and United States federal legislation. So the change 
in military plans brought new problems. Schlesinger ez-/
plained the dilemma:
If the United States kept its role small enough 
to conceal its responsibility, the operation 
might not have a fair chance of success; while 
if it made its role large enough to give the 
operation a fair chance of success, the respon­
sibility could not be plausibly disclaimed in 
case of failure. Washington might then face the 
choice between the political humiliation of de­
feat and the commitment of United States troops 
to insure victory.3d
The new plan also brought the need for stepped up re­
cruitment, and in this rush the liberal elements among the 
Cuban exiles were swept from positions of influence. With­
out consulting the President or the State Department the 
CIA chose to back right-wing groups. Tad Szulc, reporting 
in Look, stated: "When batistianos streamed into Guatemala, 
two hundred of the anti-Castro group rebelled and were 
jailed by the right-wing c o m m a n d . T h e  CIA did not real- 
ize that men who had taken part in the revolution had a 
natural hatred for officers who had served Batista--this was 
the group they had fought to overthrow. When members of the 
Frente complained about the recruitment of batistianos, the 
reply was: "They're anti-communists, aren't they?"-^
^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 235.
-^Tad Szulc, "Cuba: Anatomy of a Failure, Look, 
July 18, 1961, p. 76.
"Cuban Drama," New York Times, April 23, 1961,p. 11.
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When the right-wing group took over, it used its 
power to eliminate from command all those who held pro­
gressive or liberal views. The foremost target was Manuel/
Ray's MRP, and during the months preceding the invasion 
this organization was deprived of any assistance, even 
though it operated the most successful underground net­
work in Cuba. While explosives, weapons, and military 
supplies flowed to other groups that were not objectional 
to the CIA's field operators, the MRP had to plead, bar­
gain, and fight for every pound of explosives and supplies 
it needed. So in the critical weeks preceding the inva­
sion, the principal underground organization in Cuba was
37ignored by the very people planning the assault.
Washington kept getting reports about the splendid
morale in the training camps, even though discontent was
increasing--a discontent that broke out in insurrection in
the Guatemalan camps. The CIA operatives were forced to
arrest a number of the ringleaders and threaten to scuttle
38the whole program before it was able to regain control.
In the meantime CIA planners had chosen Trinidad, a 
city of twenty thousand on the southeast coast of Cuba as 
the point of invasion. It was chosen because it was far 
from Castro's main army, it had a good harbor and beach­
head, but--most important--it was close to the Escambray




Mountains. If the venture failed, the invaders had a place 
to which they could escape. The plan now was for an am­
phibious assault supported by paratroopers, while the rebel/
air squadron bombed Cuban airfields to destroy Castro's Air 
Force.
The plan, as related by Stewart J. Alsop, also called
for a revolutionary council of civilian Cubans, to be flown
in to set up a provisional government at the town of Giron,
who would, if the invaders could sustain themselves for a
period of "ten days to two weeks, call for recognition and
military assistance."^ Legitimacy would have the value of
making it possible for the United States to send supplies
to the government which it recognized. This rebel govern-
/ , #ment was to be headed by Jose Miro Cardona.
On January 22, 1961, two days after the inauguration 
of John F. Kennedy, Allen Dulles, speaking for the CIA, and 
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
exposed the project to the leading members of the new ad­
ministration. After listening to this briefing, Kennedy 
instructed the Defense Department to make a complete study 
of the military plan, and instructed the State Department 
to work through the OAS on a program to isolate and contain 
Cuba. On February 3> General Lemnitzer and Admiral Arleigh
^Szulc, "Cuba: Anatomy of a Failure," Look,
July 18, 1961, pp. 76-78.
^Stewart J. Alsop, "Lessons of the Cuban Disaster," 
Readers Digest, September 1961, pp. i|_30—lp31 *
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Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, endorsed the Trinidad
plan and on the basis of information available to them,
illpredicted success. /
Meetings, conferences, and briefings on the Cuban 
situation continued. Perhaps the most important was the 
one held on the fourth of April in the State Department 
with the following present: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara, Senator William J. Pulbright of 
Arkansas, (chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com­
mittee), General Lemnitzer, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and 
presidential advisors and specialists.^
After a great deal of discussion, Kennedy voiced 
opposition to the Trinidad plan as being "too spectacular." 
He wanted a "quiet landing in a more obscure place, pre­
ferably at night." He insisted also that no American 
forces were to be used, stressing the probability of anti- 
American reactions in Latin America and the United Nations. 
Kennedy was "especially concerned that the air strikes 
would seem plausibly to come from Cuban soil."^3 After 
a reevaluation of landing sites, the Bay of Pigs was 
chosen. The change had some advantage in that there would 
be less likelihood of harming civilians at the Bay of Pigs
^Ross and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. ipl.
^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 238.
^Ibid.
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because hardly anyone lived there. It was also thought 
that the landing would have the appearance of an effort 
to resupply guerrillas .kk-
Karl Meyer reported that "the one dissenting voice 
at this pivotal meeting was that of Senator Fulbright, who 
felt that the venture would be a violation of the spirit and 
possibly the letter of United States laws, as well as trea­
ties which this country had signed.̂ -5 Schlesinger, who was 
present, insisted that "although the Senator may have had 
reservations he did not, as has been written, oppose the 
invasion at this time. "̂ -6
On Wednesday afternoon, April 12, at the President's 
weekly news conference the first question asked was about 
the invasion plans for Cuba. The President in his reply 
ruled out "under any condition an intervention in Cuba by 
the United States Armed Forces. "̂ -7 "The basic issue in 
Cuba," the President said, "is not one between the United 
States and Cuba, it is between the Cubans themselves. I 
intend to see that we adhere to that principle, and as I 
understand it, this administration's attitude is so
^Ross and Wise, The Invisibile Government, p. 1+6.
^Karl Meyer, Fulbright of Arkansas (Washington D.C.: 
Robert B. Luce, Inc. ~ 1963) , P~- 193. See also Helen Fuller, 
Year of Trial: Kennedy's Crucial Decisions (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), p . 57
^Schle singer, A Thousand Days, p. 2l+0.
4̂-7"How Kennedy Upset Invasion," United States News 
& World Report, February 1+, 1963, p. 29.
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understood and shared by anti-Castro exiles from Cuba in 
this country."^® In so saying the President had tied his 
hands--if the invasion failed there would be no help com-
ing from the United States. Ironically, members of the 
American armed forces did participate, and as will be later 
revealed, the plans called for a full scale invasion by 
American forces if the exiles could hold a beachhead until 
a temporary government could be established.
The Cuban brigade in Guatemala now numbered li|00 men, 
of these only about 135 were former soldiers. Of the rest 
2I4.O students made up the largest single group. Also in­
cluded were, businessmen, lawyers, doctors, landowners and 
their sons, fishermen and peasants. The average age was 
twenty nine. Many of them were new recruits and had been 
at the base only a few days--some had not even fired a gun. 
Meyer and Szulc reported "their spirits were high, and all 
were waiting impatiently for the target date which had been 
set at April 17, 1961."^ Many factors, enumerated later, 
determined the choice of invasion date.
The brigade was moved to the point of embarkation and 
on April 13, they began loading on boats. The CIA had 
leased three old and worn-out commercial vessels from the 
Garcia Lines for two months, and had also purchased two
•̂®"In Cuban Invasion: The Fatal Mistakes," United 
States News & World Report, May 29, 1961, p. 76; Fuller, 
Year of Trial~| p3 59.
^Meyer and Szulc, "The Cuban Invasion," New Repub­
lic, May 21, 1962, p. 230.
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LCIs. On April II4. the invasion plan was revealed to the 
troops. The brigades mission was to take and hold two
beaches, Playa Giron and Plava Larga, for three days, after/
which, they were told, "they could put their hands out,
turn left and go straight into Havana."^0
Neutralization of Castro's air force was to take
place before the invasion by air strikes from Nicaraguan 
5>1 'bases. These were now under debate--the State Depart­
ment was afraid that pre-invasion strikes would show the 
American hand, but the Pentagon insisted that they were 
essential in order to protect the disembarkation. A com­
promise provided that a strike would be made against Cuban 
airfields two days before the invasion by Cuban pilots 
pretending to be defectors from Castro's air force. U-2
flights would then assess the damages, and a second strike
32would be made the morning of the invasion.
Havana was awakened early Saturday morning April 1$, 
by the roar of aircraft and bomb explosions. Looking up 
it saw two B-26 bombers with the insignia of Castro's 
Revolutionary Air Force making dive passes at the Camp 
Libertad airfield on the outskirts of the city. A little 
earlier the bombers had strafed the big air force base at
^°Haynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 83.
^M. Stanton Evans, The Politics of Surrender (New 
York: Devan-Adair Company" 1966). p . 3&3•
92^ Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 270.
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3k
San Antonio de Los Banos, and a third group did the same 
a little later at the Santiago air field in the province 
of Oriente.^
The pilots returned to Nicaragua and the United 
States with optimistic reports of widespread damage, but 
the overflights the next day showed only five aircraft de­
finitely destroyed. Not all attacking planes made it back 
--one made an emergency landing at Key West.-^ In the 
meantime, according to Time, "one B-26 had flown straight 
from Nicaragua to Miami to put the cover plan into oper­
ation. The pilot on landing announced himself as a Castro 
defector who had just bombed the airfields. The unsched­
uled arrival of the second plane at Key West complicated 
things s o m e w h a t . T h e  Revolutionary Council sitting in 
New York issued a communique announcing that "the B-26s 
had been flown out of Cuba by defecting Castro airmen who 
decided to inflict a little damage before escaping the is­
land. The deceit was rather flimsy, for although the
CIA had taken pains to disguise the B-26s with Castro
^"Massacre: Cuban Invasion," Time, April 28,
1961, p. 18.
^ROSS and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. Iql. 
Nine B-26s had left Nicaragua. One was shot down, and 
three had landed, respectively, at Key West, Grand Cay­
man and Miami. Two pilots were dead. But five of the 
bombers returned to Happy Valley, Nicaragua.
^ Time, April 28, 1961, p. 18.
^Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 120.
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markings, they had overlooked the fact that Castro's 
B-26s were equipped with plexiglass noses, while the air­
craft used by the rebel pilots were models with opaque
noses. The rocket mounts were corroded and the guns were 
uncocked and had not been fired.^7
Kennedy, who had great concern for the United Nations 
aspect of the Cuban operation, had said to a group at a 
briefing in the cabinet room that he wanted Adlai Stevenson, 
United Nations representative, to be fully informed, and 
that nothing that was said at the United Nations should be 
anything but the truth. "The integrity and credibility of 
Stevenson," Kennedy had remarked, "constitute one of our 
great national assets. I don't want anything to be done 
which might jeopardize that."58
Raul Roa, Castro's United Nations delegate, de­
nounced the vandalistic "aggression carried out at dawn," 
and placed responsibility for the attack on the government 
of the United States. ^  When Roa finished, Adlai Stevenson 
began his reply. Haynes Johnson said: "It was to be the
most humiliating moment in his distinguished career. Twice 
a candidate for the presidency, urbane and eloquent, a man 
whose reputation for statesmanship and integrity was
57"gitter Week: The Cuban Invasion," Time, April 28, 
1961, p. 18. Planes used by rebels were old relics secured 
by CIA redeemed from United States Air Force graveyards.
58schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 271.
59"iji0ward D-Day," Time, April 21, 1961, p. 32.
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unquestioned, was now trapped by a tangle of lies.”60 
There appears to be some controversy over how much Steven­
son had been told. Victor Lasky, in J.F.K., The Man and--------------- --------------------------- /
the Myth, says that President Kennedy never discussed the 
proposed Cuban invasion with either Stevenson or Chester 
Bowles, who had been his chief advisors on foreign affairs 
during his campaign. This was especially strange in the 
case of Stevenson because he was the man in the administra­
tion most informed on Latin American affairs.6l Ross and 
Wise disagree, saying that a couple of days before the 
April 15 raid, Tracy Barnes, the CIA man assigned as liai­
son with the State Department, came to see Stevenson in New 
York and briefed him on the Bay of Pigs operation. He in­
dicated vaguely that the United States would not be in­
volved. But as he told about the Cuban exiles, his story 
was so ambiguous, Stevenson became convinced that the 
United States was involved.62
The last "no-go” point had been reached and the 
President had given his consent for the expedition to pro­
ceed. In the meantime the CIA cover story was beginning 
to crack--it was evident that Stevenson had misinformed 
the United Nations. Readers Digest reported: "Rusk,
60Haynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 92.
6lvictor Lasky, J.F.K., The Man and the Myth (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p . 520.
62ross and wise, The Invisible Government, p. 16.
See also Fuller, Year of Trial, p. 57 •
remorseful at the position into which the State Department 
had thrust its United Nations ambassador, now resolved that 
the Cuban adventure should not be permitted further to I
jeopardize the larger interest of the United States foreign 
policy."^3
A description of the scene aboard the invasion fleet 
is told by men who participated. Haynes Johnson inter­
viewed these men as they returned from Cuban prison camps. 
"The men lounged, listening to the radio, talking, trying 
not to appear nervous. Everyone was afraid of acting 
afraid." At sunset, as the ships neared the southern coast 
of Cuba, the men were called together on deck. They sa­
luted as the Cuban flag was raised. By 7:^5 o'clock the 
five principal ships and their two United States Navy es­
cort vessels had reached the rendezvous point, where they 
were joined by landing craft carrying the tanks and heavy 
equipment. "The men began singing the Cuban National hymn 
as the convoy began moving up the coast toward the Bay of 
Pigs."6^
With the coming of the night a clandestine radio 
transmitter operated by the CIA on Swan Island began send­
ing this message into the Caribbean sky: "Alert I Alert'. 
Look well at the rainbow. The first will rise very soon. 
Chico is in the house. Visit him. The sky is blue. Place
^ Readers Digest, September 19614., p. 256.
^Haynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, pp. 9I4.-95.
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notice in the tree. The tree is green and brown. The let­
ters are white. The fish will not take much time to rise.
38
The fish is red. Look well at the rainbow. . . . "  It was
' 63the message for the Cuban underground to rise.
Schlesinger gives the following account of the
At 2 a.m., frogmen slid into the water from 
speedboats, and swam to the two beaches to in­
stall position lights and destroy any obstacles 
to the landing. Two battalions from the brigade 
went ashore at Playa Giron and one battalion at 
Playa Larga, while another was sent to the north 
to secure the air strip. Difficulty was encoun­
tered on the coral reefs that had been ignored 
or forgotten in the briefing, but the invaders 
encountered little initial resistance as they 
waded ashore. At daybreak paratroops had/been 
dropped inland to secure interior points.
Castro's air force, alerted by the first clash, 
roared into the sky at daybreak with orders to concentrate 
on rebel shipping. At nine-thirty in the morning a Sea 
Fury sank the ship carrying all the amunition reserve for 
the next ten days and most of the communications equipment. 
Newsweek described the loss "as an inexplicable concentra­
tion of treasure in a single hull."^
65Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 125;
Ross and Wise, in The Invisible Government,- p. Ip3, said that 
the radio message was taken from a code used by persecuted 
Christians in the Roman era in which they would draw a fish 
to indicate a clandestine meeting was to be held. The CIA 
had selected this as a symbol for the invasion. (Hence the 
business about fish rising, which Radio Swan had broadcast 
Sunday night.)
battle:
The Consequences," Newsweek, May 1, 1961
A Thousand Days, p. 273*
p. 2ip.
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In the lull following the first attack, C —i_|_6 trans­
ports carrying the brigade paratroopers flew over the beach 
on their way inland. One of the fliers later told Haynes 
Johnson that, "one of the planes dipped low to salute the 
invaders, and as it did, the men on the ground opened 
fire." Bullets passed through the fuselage. "What the
hell's going on?" one paratrooper yelled. "They've gone
„68crazy.
On the Houston the greenest battalion was left.
They were reluctant to get off. The American commander 
shouted in anger: "It's your war you bastards. Get off!" 
As they got off and headed for the beach, they heard be­
hind them the motors of an airplane. They thought it was 
one of theirs. The plane attacked them and as it came 
around for the second pass the commander shouted, "every­
body fire at the God damn thing." This time they hit, and
69when it made a third pass it went down in flames.
The fighting went on through a hot, clear day, the 
invaders digging in behind their tanks, bazookas and mor­
tars, but by early Tuesday it was clear that the invasion 
was in trouble. Trouble was brewing in other spots of the 
world also.^9
Kruschev sent an angry note to Washington denouncing 
the invasion, saying: "As to the Soviet Union there should *69
/ QHaynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 112.
69Ibid.
7°Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 275-
be no misunderstanding our position. We shall render the 
Cuban people and their government all necessary assistance 
in beating back the armed attack on Cuba." In the after­
noon Kennedy sent his reply: "I have previously stated, 
and I repeat now, that the United States intends no mili­
tary intervention in Cuba. In the event of any military 
intervention by outside forces we will immediately honour
our obligations under the inter-American system to protect
71this hemisphere against external aggression."
That evening the President called another meeting of 
his staff to discuss what could be done to relieve the sit­
uation on the beaches of Cuba. The navy wanted to use an 
air strike against Castro from the carrier Essex lying off 
Cuba, supposedly on navy maneuvers. Admiral Burke said:
"We are involved sir. We trained and armed these Cubans.
We helped land them on the beaches, God dammit, Mr. Presi­
dent, we can't let those boys be slaughtered there.” The 
President finally consented to allow six unmarked jets from 
the Essex to fly the mission over the Bay of Pigs for the 
hour before dawn Wednesday morning. Their mission would be
to cover a B-26 attack from Nicaragua, but they were not to
72seek air combat. The groups started out that night but 
through one more mixup in this doomed affair the B-26s
^D. Lawrence, "Let's Invade Cuba," United States 
News & World Report, November 6, 1961, p. Il6.
^ Readers Digest, September 196[|_, p. 263. A later 
account said this was the carrier Boxer--not the Essex.
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arrived over the beachhead an hour ahead of jet support.
The result was disastrous.
By Wednesday fighting on the beaches was over. A /
reporter for Readers Digest wrote: "For three days men 
had fought without rest and little food and water. Almost 
to a man they were captured or killed. A few put out to 
sea on rafts but few of these survived." Shortly after 5 
p.m. Wednesday the Free Cuban beach commander sent a final 
message: "I am destroying all my equipment. I have noth­
ing left to fight with. The enemy tanks are already in 
my position. Farewell, friends."73
Meyer and Szulc summarized: "At the moment of defeat 
there were no answers--only questions." At noon on Thurs­
day President Kennedy appeared before the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors to discuss the recent events in Cuba. 
The President was composed and impressive, but the strain 
had taken its toll. The belligerant tone was that of a 
thwarted leader searching for release from a sense of 
defeat, as he said:
. . . let the record show that our restraint
is not inexhaustible. If the nations of this 
hemisphere should fail to meet their committments 
against outside communist penetration then this 
government will not hesitate in meeting its pri­
mary obligations which are the security of our 
nation. Should that time ever come, we do not 
intend to be lectured on intervention by those 
whose character was stamped for all time on the 
bloody streets of Budapest.7l+
. i
73ibid., p. 267.
7^+Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. Iip2,
CHAPTER III /
Reaction and Response
When the extent of the debacle became clear, the 
American reaction came quickly. President Kennedy was 
fully prepared to shoulder the blame, but was not pre­
pared for "I-told-him-so" reports that began to appear in 
print.1 The New York Times reported that Secretary Dean 
Rusk and under-Secretary Bowles had advised against the in­
vasion.1 2 * Kennedy called Rusk and "blisteringly" reminded 
him that he had not offered such advice at the time.
Bowles was confronted by Robert F. Kennedy in a personal 
confrontation, who jabbed his finger at him and said, "I 
understand you advised against this operation. Well let 
me tell you something as of right now, you did not, you 
were for it." This was not true, however, for Bowles had 
filed a report stating his opposition and presented it to 
Rusk, but it never came to the attention of the President.3
When reports reached the President indicating that 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had stated they were bypassed,
1"Cuba: The Consequences," Newsweek, May 1, 1961.
2Tad Szulc, "From Robin Hood to Revolutionary
Oracle," New York Times Magazine, July 16, 1961, p. lip.
^Newsweek, May 1, 1961, p. 28.
Kennedy called McNamara and told him to "crack the whip." 
Some members of the CIA were also trying to save face, 
saying they had opposed the operation. Dulles was call- /
ed and told to "get the agents in line."^ Newsweek sym­
pathized, stating: "The President took the rap himself, 
but the haunting, significant fact remained; somewhere 
along the line, trusted men failed him."^
The press did not deal too unkindly with the Pres­
ident. In the opinion of the Nation, what amounted to a 
fait accompli confronted Kennedy when he took office. The 
invasion plans had already been made, and he was given to
understand that they had been designed by his predecessor
/--a man of awesome military reputation. According to the 
New Republic the situation inherited by the Kennedy admin­
istration "had its own dynamics, and like a boulder roll­
ing downhill the process gathered its own momentum and 
became constantly harder to stop."^ So it was not a mat­
ter of inaugurating a new process, but whether to stop an 
existing one. The new administration would encounter much 
more domestic criticism for stopping an anti-Castro move­
ment already underway than for simply launching one. *&
^-Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper
& Row, 1965) » p. 29)+.
^Newsweek, May 1, 1961, p. 28.
^F. J. Cook, "CIA--The Case Builds Up," Nation,
June 22, 1961̂ , p. 6l6.
^Louis J. Halle, "Lessons of the Cuban Blunder,"
New Republic, June 53 1961, p. 13.
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Victor Lasky, author of J. F . K., The Man and the
Myth, takes issue with the argument that Kennedy had no al­
ternative but to approve the Cuban plans inaugurated by his 
predecessor. During the later stages of the I960 campaign, 
Kennedy had taunted the Eisenhower administration for al­
lowing a communist regime to exist less than ninety miles 
from the coast of the United States. In his campaign prom­
ises he had called for what amounted to a direct interven­
tion in Cuba. He said: "We must attempt to strengthen the 
non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in 
Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing 
Castro.
After our country’s humiliation in the Bay of Pigs, 
Eisenhower, in keeping with a lifelong practice of support­
ing the nation's commander in chief in times of crises, 
called upon the American people to stand by President Ken­
nedy. He said vehemently that the last thing they should 
want was an immediate public airing of the Cuban fiasco, 
likening such demands to "witch-hunting."^
When Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Theodore C. Soren­
son, ranking members of Kennedy's staff, wrote their intim­
ate histories of the Kennedy administration they attempted 9
^Victor Lasky, J. F. K., The Man and the Myth (New 
York: Devan-Adair, 1965) ? p"! 516. See also Hugh Sidey,
John F. Kennedy, President (New York: Atheneum, 1963),
P. 14-3.
9U.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks of 
Hon. John W. Wydler, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., A5)+35*
to link the Eisenhower administration with the Cuban in­
vasion and sought also to discredit Eisenhower's appointed 
military and intelligence experts. The disputed material 
is summed up for both in the following paragraph from the 
Sorenson version: "On January 20, 1961, John Kennedy in­
herited the plan, the planners, and most troubling of all, 
the Cuban's exile brigade. . . . Unlike an inherited pol­
icy statement of Executive order, this inheritance would 
not be simply disposed of by Presidential decision or 
withdrawal."'1'̂  The purpose of the statement was to exon­
erate, but in reality it constituted a disservice to, the 
late President Kennedy, who at no time sought to shift the 
responsibility for any of his executive decisions.
It was at this point that Eisenhower in the interest 
of historical accuracy decided to set the record straight 
by giving the public the facts about these earlier events. 
In an interview with Earl Mazo, he gave his account of the 
situation as it existed when he left the White House. Dur­
ing the transition period between administrations he brief­
ed Kennedy on all pending matters including the secret pro­
gram inaugurated the year before to train and equip Cuban 
refugees. He stressed that no committments had been made 
that might bind the new President. If Kennedy had wished
10Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 295*
the Cuban exile brigade was still so small and relatively 
unprepared it could easily have been disbanded.11
In his book, The Wine is Bitter, Milton Eisenhower, /
brother of the ex-President, maintains that Eisenhower did
not have any plan to sponsor an invasion of Cuba. However,
recognizing that there might come a day when the pressure
from refugees would increase and the situation dictate some
action, approval was given the CIA to organize and give
. IPmilitary training to Cuban exile groups. In Ordeal of 
Power, Emmet John Hughes states: "It is hardly conceiv­
able that an Eisenhower could have presided over so abor­
tive a military action as the half-invasion of Cuba in 
April of 1961."13
Of the nonpolitical experts retained by Kennedy, not­
ably Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, and the military Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower said: "These men over decades 
of devoted service have shown their capabilities, their 
sense of logic, their understanding of the problems in­
volved in this kind of venture. There is no more expert 
group in their profession than these men. . . . Nothing
that has been said by Kennedy and others after the Bay of
Hu.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks 
of Hon. John W. Wydler, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., A5^35»
^Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter (New York: 
Doubleday, 1963), p. 269.
13Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York: 
Atheneum, 1963), p. 356. See also U.S., Congressional 
Record, Joseph Clark, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 10337*
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Pigs debacle has shaken my faith in these men." He be­
lieved: "The very disparagement of these seasoned pro­
fessionals showed how unqualified the presidential advisors 
were to deal with the sort of problem involved in a crit­
ical international venture like the Bay of Pigs."-^ Hugh 
Sidey described them as brave men from a brave era when the 
United States had no peer as a military power--the ribbons 
on their chests marked their years of success.^
When Kennedy directed the joint chiefs to review the 
plans and combat readiness of the proposed venture to de­
termine its chance of success, they reported that the op­
eration was "marginal" but did have a good chance of top- 
ling Castro.^ Tully maintains that they made the en­
dorsement on two conditions--that CIA was correct in its
appraisal of the political situation and that the rebels
17would control the air over the beachhead. ' United States 
News & World Report pointed out that military men are ac­
customed to make careful detailed studies, but these could 
not be made because the plans for invading Cuba were so
■^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
A5435.
19̂Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy (New York: Atheneum, 
1963), p. 125.
^ Newsweek, May 1, 1961, p. 2l|_.
^Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York: 
Morrow, 1962), p. 25.
secret that even the joint chiefs were not given adequate 
information.-*-® The judgments made were not based on obser­
vation but upon information given by the CIA. It was also^ 
made clear that the plans as approved by the joint chiefs 
went through many changes before the invasion occured.
All who participated will have to share the respon­
sibility for the failure, but the agency most directly im­
plicated was the CIA. Not only did it procure the arms 
and train the invaders, it was CIA's intelligence estimates 
upon which the other agencies made their plans and deci­
sions. Time quoted the Raleigh (North Carolina) News and 
Observer saying: "Americans would be safer if the CIA 
Chief Allen Dulles were allowed to depart, taking his 
frayed cloak and blunt dagger with him into private life." 
The Time added that even Eleanor Roosevelt suggested 
mildly that the CIA was not very well informed.-1-̂  Life 
reporters wrote: "The invasion had been prematurely timed, 
inadequately mounted, strategically doomed, and based on 
woefully inept intelligence or wildly wishful thinking or 
both. The responsibility lay upon the agencies of the 
United States--the CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff.
l®"In Cuban Invasion: The Fatal Mistakes," United 
States News <Sc World Report, February Ip, 1963.
19"inquest: Cuban Invasion Fiasco," Time, May 5*
1961, pp. 58-9. For a detailed discussion see Norman 
Cousins, "The Cuba Incident and the Rule of Law, Saturday 
Review, May 13, 1961, p. 27.
20"Bitter Fruits of Defeat: Worldwide Jeers and 
Tears," Life, April 28, 1961, p. 22.
Much of the criticism involved the failure to use 
the forces inside Cuba. There was already available in 
the Escambray mountains an effective guerrilla band. This 
"ready to fight" anti-Castro force needed only food and
PIweapons to be effective. But adequate help never came.
The group was further weakened by a Castro "round-up" 
early in 1961, in which many were taken into custody along 
with tons of American-made munitions. Javier Felipe Pasoz 
Vea, a Cuban who had been with Castro in Sierra Maestra, 
had tried to convince the planners that military interven­
tion would be a disaster. He said: "The overthrow of com­
munism by internal revolutionary forces is a far better so-
22lution for the West and for the Cubans." The New Repub­
lic was certain the vital missing part was the lack of 
participation by the Cuban people in whose name the inva­
sion was being fought.^3
When Eisenhower first directed the CIA to organize 
the exiles, batistianos were specifically excluded. These 
were the adherents of the ousted dictator Batista, dedi­
cated to restoring the order that had existed under him 
with all of its inequities of absentee landlords and impov­
erished peasantry. Tully relates that President Kennedy
21"Cuba: Anatomy of a Failure," Look, July l8, 1961,
p. 78.
PP "Cuba: Long Live the Revolution," New Republic,
November 3, 1962, pp. l£-l6.
23"QUban Invasion," New Republic, May 21, 1962, p.
23.
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also issued an order excluding them from the Liberation 
Army, but the CIA refused to put the ban into effect. Im­
portant Batista officers, including the San Roman brothers,)
were given important commands because, as CIA explained, 
they were proven anti-communists .2̂4- Castro himself had 
said in an interview with Henri-Brasson, French journal­
ist who was commissioned by L ife to do an on-the-spot 
story in March 1963? that the invasion was doomed from the 
start because the brigade was composed of batistianos.̂
Meyer and Szulc wrote that many agents measured re­
liability by the loudness with which they denounced Castro 
and communism. To the CIA, former Batista officers were 
simply anti-communists who were zealous in opposing the 
rascal who humiliated their army. To many Cubans there was
no distinction between "good" and "bad" Batista officers--
P Athey were all bad. ° The New Leader pointed out that there 
were available many former members of the rebel army among 
the exiles but most of them would not fight alongside 
former members of Batista's army or police, and certainly 
would not serve under them.^?
It was not only the batistianos that were favored.
2^-Tully, CIA: The Inside Story, p. 2l|_9.
25h enri Cartier-Brasson, "Castro's Cuba Seen Face 
to Face," Life, March 1$, 1963? p. 30.
26]y[eyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 106.
^Draper, "Cuba and United States Policy," New 
Leader, June 5? 1961, p. 6.
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The New Republic reported that the United States was back­
ing, as the invasion boss and successor to Castro, the re­
latively unknown Manuel Artime Buesa, a one-time Castro /
soldier who had served briefly as an official in an agrar­
ian reform zone in Oriente. His military experience was 
inconsequential, but he was an accomplished orator. His 
support lay with the more conservative sections of the Rev­
olutionary Council, but commanded little influence in Cuba. 
The CIA, while promoting the more conservative group, 
pushed aside the better-established opposition of Manuel 
Ray who had the best-established underground organization 
in Cuba.28 Tully asserts that:
Ray had built up this organization of saboteurs 
during a precarious eight-month stay in Cuba 
after he broke with Castro, and it was a model 
of its kind. The network spanned the entire 
island with a seven-man executive council in 
each province and lesser commands reaching down 
to the smallest village.
Ray became the target of reactionary exile Cuban business­
men and politicians. The word was passed that Ray was a 
dangerous leftist who would continue a communist economy 
in Cuba, eliminating only Castro.29
The CIA fieldmen failed to see or chose to ignore the 
fact that the left-of-center groups were attracting most of 
the dissident support in Cuba itself. These more liberal 
groups were representative of Castro’s 26th of July
28"What Went Wrong," New Republic, May 1, 1961,
P. 11+.
29Tully, CIA: The Inside Story, p. 214-5*
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movement who had taken his program of democratic social 
reform seriously, and defected only when they came to be­
lieve that he was heading toward a form of communist to- 
talitarianism.30 Among these were a group of top guer­
rilla fighters, defecting captains from Castro's rebel 
army, several of whom had previously attended United States 
jungle warfare school in Panama. They were now idle and 
desired to enlist in the Cuban Brigade but were ignored by 
CIA.31 Castro said these people were disillusioned be­
cause they were not appointed to the high positions they 
thought they deserved or they did not receive an expected 
portion of the property taken from foreign investors. Dis­
sent was certain these were the people that should have 
been used in Castro's overthrow. It said: "It was crimin­
ally stupid to work once again with discredited right wing 
forces, with men whose committment to social reform (or to 
democratic government) was dubious to say the least."32
When the deep divisions among the troops that were 
being trained became apparent, the Frente was disbanded and 
the Cuban Revolutionary Council was formed. This in­
cluded such men as Miro Cardona, Castro's first premier
30"The Invasion that Could not Succeed," Reporter,
May 11, 1961, p. 20; Draper, "Cuba and United States 
Policy, New Leader, June 5* 1961, p. 7*
3lRichard Rovere, "Letter from Washington," New 
Yorker, May 6, 1961, p. 139.
32Michael Walzer, "Cuba: The Invasion and the Con­
sequences," Dissent, June 1961, p. L|_.
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and Manuel Ray, both of whom were far to the left of the 
Frente politicians. This did not stop the feuding. When 
Artime arbitrarily changed a number of commanders, there
was open rebellion. Two hundred men refused to fight under 
their new commander, Captain Robert San Roman, because he 
had served as an officer under Batista.33 This group was 
placed under arrest and isolated, under guard, from the 
rest of the troops. A few escaped and others eventually 
rejoined their command but a hard core refused to give in. 
These dissidents received rough treatment from the CIA.
They were flown to a remote jungle airstrip at Sayaxche, 
in Peten province, and then taken upriver in canoes to what 
was called a "reindoctrination camp." It was actually a 
prison from which they were not released until after the 
Bay of Pigs invasion failure.3k
This unhappy condition reflected the entire invasion 
plan. If the CIA had availed itself early of a more lib­
eral organization that had wider appeal among Cubans and 
also controlled an effective anti-Castro underground, the 
adventure would have had a better chance. There is sound 
military reason to believe that with full use of this un­
derground the venture may have been successful.33
The original plan was to build up the underground
i
33h aynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs, p. 62. 
3^-Tully, CIA: The Inside Story, p. 2I4.7.
35lbid., p . 2)4.9
within Cuba through a long, slow period of guerrilla in­
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filtration by exiles trained in Guatemala. Castro's 
opponents, many of them ex-comrades from his guerrilla , 
days, urgently advised that only guerrilla warfare could 
succeed in overthrowing Castro. The efforts to help the 
anti-Castro guerrillas, to supply them with needed equip­
ment, and to assist them to establish firm bases failed. 
The Escambray commanders were intensely suspicious of the 
ultimate aims of the divergent exile groups and were re­
luctant to swear allegiance to them.36 Charles W. Thayer 
in his book Guerrilla, suggests that American military ad 
visors opposed guerrilla type operations because to them, 
"the guerrilla's foraging and grubbing for food seemed 
primitive compared to the intricate system of logistics 
they had learned." The primitive weapons of guerrilla 
fighting, such as knives, spears, shotguns, and hand-made 
bombs, "have none of the allure of the expensive hardware 
of the modern arsenal." They regarded guerrilla warfare 
as something second rate and degrading for professional 
officers. Even though the American military was not to 
have an active part in the Castro overthrow, their in­
fluence was felt by the sponsors of the Cuban operation. 
Thayer goes on to say that it was doubtful whether a move 
ment based on democratic organization and dedicated to 
legality can ever be "ruthless and cruel enough to impose
^Editorial, New York Times, April 22, 1961, p. 2î_.
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the brutal discipline a modern guerrilla force demands.
By far the most effective and co-ordinated under­
ground network in the country, particularly in Havana and 
other urban areas, was the MRPs led by Manuel Ray, the man 
the CIA had pushed aside. The Reporter was certain he was 
the one man whose efforts could have been most effective 
in setting off internal rebellion. The entire operation 
was based on the assumption of a popular uprising against 
Castro as soon as the landing materialized. The Cuban ex­
ile force was to be the catalyst, a core of trained fight­
ers, around which discontented Cubans would rally.
Fortune’s description of what was to take place included
a barrage of radio broadcasts from a nearby 
island and showers of pamphlets from air­
planes intended to galvanize the anti-Castro 
Cubans in the cities and villages. Once the 
beachhead was consolidated and fighting went 
foreward, to link up with the guerrillas in­
side Cuba, a mass revolt would be stimulated. ^
Manuel Ray’s underground was prepared to hit pre-selected 
targets and also had available fourteen transmitters scat­
tered across the country to appeal to the people. But they 
never went into action--they received no word in advance. *&
37charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla (New York: Harper
& Row, 1963)j p. 19.
3®"The Invasion That Could Not Succeed”, Reporter, 
May 11, 1961, p. 22. Thayer (see footnote above) said: 
"The expectation of an uprising was so great, that along 
with the first wave of invaders, I4.OOO extra rifles were 
sent ashore to arm the newcomers."
^Charles V. Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Set 
Straight," Fortune, September 1961, p. 97*
The leaders of the Cuban Revolutionary Council were given 
no opportunity to co-ordinate with the Cuban underground. 
They were held incommunicado by the CIA at an abandoned /
airfield somewhere in Florida while the invasion was under­
way. Reporter William Shannon said: "The co-ordinator of 
the Cuban underground had a few days earlier journeyed 
from the island to Miami in order to make plans; the inva­
sion caught him 'flatfooted', and as a result, there was 
no sabotage or uprising."^® Look reported the underground
co-ordinator was fast asleep in Miami when news of the 
illinvasion earned
The CIA strategists knew of the Escambray mountain 
fighters and other effective underground groups but had 
little patience with them, saying that they were not suf­
ficiently conscious of security. A more likely reason for 
their mistrust, however, may have been their lack of con­
trol over them. Right-wing conservatives also influenced 
the elimination of the use of these more radical anti- 
Castro organizations inside Cuba, destroying the very ma­
chinery that may have brought about Castro's downfall.^
The invasion force was given first priority at the 
expense of the anti-Castro forces inside Cuba. It was a
^U.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks 
of Hon. William Fitts Ryan, quoting Mr. William Shannon 
on Cuba, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., A2932.
^Tad Szulc, "Cuba: Anatomy of a Failure," Look,
July 18, 1961, p. 91.
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^Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 87. -
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crucial mistake to proceed, not knowing the strength of 
the possible internal rebellion against Castro and what it 
was capable of doing. Not alerting these forces as to the
precise time of invasion discouraged them from taking ac­
tion until they knew the nature and extent of what was tak­
ing place. They would not risk their lives until they had 
some assurance the invasion could succeed.^ Monahan and 
Gilmore quoted a Cuban guerrilla fighter as saying:
Despite setbacks, the underground was still 
in fair shape. I am positive that, given the 
word, we could have carried out the major plan 
of co-ordinated uprisings and sabotage. But 
we were told nothing. We were left completely 
in the dark.k-k-
Kennedy came in for his share of the blame for the 
lack of response from the Cuban people. Critics maintained 
that by repeatedly proclaiming that America would not under 
any circumstances become involved in the action against 
Cuba, he demoralized the population supposedly being re­
lied on to revolt against the "oppressors." On the advice 
of Rusk, Stevenson, and Bowles, even the arrangements for 
arousing the Cuban populace with leaflets, cards, and 
radio broadcasts was deleted from the plan. The fear be­
ing that this was too obvious a showing of United States
i
^Draper, "Cuba 
June 5> 1961, p. 27.
and United States Policy," New Leader,
MlJames Monahan 
Deception (New York:
and Kenneth Gilmore, The Great 
Farrar Strauss, 1963), p. 11.
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hand.^ Lasky states: "It was all good propaganda for 
world consumption . . . but the effect was to serve notice 
on Cubans in Cuba, who were waiting for an encouraging /
signal from the United States, that if they rose up against 
Castro tyranny, it would be at their own risk. "̂ -8
After the invasion failed and the CIA was accused of 
making a faulty prediction that there would be an uprising, 
Dulles responded that he knew of no estimate that a sponta­
neous uprising would be touched off by the landing.^ Drew 
Pearson said the invader’s strategy was "to hold out in the 
swamp and on the beach." There would be enough uprisings 
across the country so the beachhead could be held and con­
solidated until the rebels could establish a government on 
Cuban soil.^ The Cuban Revolutionary Council was to be 
flown in, from the Opa-Locka, Florida airfield where they 
were held in readiness, to proclaim itself the new govern­
ment of Cuba. Meyer and Szulc state: "The assumption was 
that the invaders could hold the Bay of Pigs long enough 
to establish a provisional government--and . . .  it could 
appeal to the outside world for help and the United States
^Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," Fortune, 
September 1961, p. 227.
^Lasky, J. F. K., The Man and the Myth, p. 519
^Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1963), p . 31•
^Robert E. Light and Carl Marzani, Cuba versus CIA 
(New York: Marzani Munsell, Inc., 1961), p7 51•
Joe Alex Morris, Jr.would be in a position to respond. "̂ -9
reported in the Miami Herald Tribune;
The United States Navy was reported to have
two task forces, each with a carrier opera- '
ting in the Caribbean area, instead of the
usual one. Both were said to be engaged in
routine exercises, as were 1,700 marines in
Puerto Rico. . . . American Naval and Air Force
units in the area were on a constant alert.50
The exercises were cancelled after the invasion failure. 
Only naivete could misread United States aspirations and 
intentions. Walter Lippman in a critical analysis, wrote: 
"No plans seem to have been made, no thought seems to have 
been given, to what we would do then, what the rest of 
Latin America would do then, what the Soviet Union would 
do while the civil war was being fought."51
Shortly after the Revolutionary Council was formed on 
March 22, 1961, it released its "minimum program." Ironic­
ally it had to be cautioned against placing too much 
stress on the restoration of American property taken by 
Castro. In the opinion of Meyer and Szulc, their pledges 
seemed to be addressed more to an American than a Cuban 
audience. The Council declaration was: "We emphatically 
assure those who have been unjustly dispossessed that all 
their assets shall be returned." Manuel Varona, president
^Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. II4.O;
Haynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 121; Schlesinger, A 
Thousand Days, p7 27k•
5C>Light and Marzani, Cuba versus CIA, p. 50.
5lwalter Lippman, Washington Post, May 2, 1961, p. Ip.
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of the Council, went so far as to say: "The need for 
agrarian reform in Cuba is a myth."^
The New Yorker questioned whether the Cuban masses, 
would have revolted even if properly alerted. They may 
have been "so pleased with their lot under Castro that 
they would not have welcomed a successor government of any 
sort.Interestingly, Senator-elect Claiborne Pell, Dem­
ocrat of Rhode Island, after a visit to Castro's Cuba in 
December, I960 said: "The people of Cuba that I saw and 
spoke to were not sullen or unhappy or dissatisfied."
About the same time, two other expert observers of­
fered similar findings. They were General Hugh B. Hester, 
a veteran of the Southwest Pacific campaign in World War II, 
and Jesse Gordon, a public relations consultant. They found 
that 86 per cent of the people supported Castro and that if 
elections were held, Castro would be overwhelmingly returned 
to power. They concluded that if the United States military 
high command proceeded with its plan to invade Cuba, the 
result would be disastrous.̂  Dissent declared: "It was 
criminally stupid to attempt to plunge Cuba into a civil *6
^Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 107 •
^Rovere, "Letters from Washington," New Yorker, May
6, 1961, p. 11+5.
^New York Herald Tribune, April 20, 1961, p. 11.
^Hugh B. Hester and Jesse Gordon, "A New Look at 
Cuba--the Challenge of Kennedy," New York Review, April 
12, 1961, p. 63-
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war in the absence of clear signs of internal revolt.
Animosity toward Americans had deep historical roots 
on the island. This anti-American feeling was especially 
strong among many liberal and propertyless Cubans. An in­
vasion, no matter how it was disguised by Americans, looked 
to many Cubans--and to the rest of the world--as a revival 
of past landings of United States marines. The New Yorker 
summarized: "There was practically no one who believed
that any undertaking of this sort would have been either 
morally defensible or politically wise or 'paramilitarily' 
feasable if it failed to obtain the support of the people 
whose country was to be assaulted."57
On April 3? 1961, Kennedy ordered the State Depart­
ment to publish a White Paper on Cuba. It was a document 
written largely by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., which appealed 
to the Castro regime to "return to the original purposes 
which brought so many gallant men together in the Sierra 
Maestra and to restore the integrity of the Cuban Revolu­
tion."^® It was designed to prepare public opinion at home 6
•^®Walzer, "Cuba: The Invasion and the Consequences, 
Dissent, June 1961, p. Ip.
^Rovere, "Letters from Washington," New Yorker May
6, 1961, p. 139.
■̂ ®Ibid. , p. llpl; Draper, "Cuba and United States 
Policy," New Leader, June 5? 1961, p. 92; Ross and Wise,
The Invisible Government, p. Ip 1; M. Stanton Evans, The 
Politics of Surrender [New York: Devan-Adair, 196677
p. 381.
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and abroad for the imminent clandestine invasion. The 
Monthly Review was very outspoken in its criticism, declar­
ing it to be an attempt to justify its determination to
t
destroy the Cuban Revolution. It raised this question: "Is 
it perhaps that the government never wanted Cuba to do more 
than rest on the Constitution of 191+0, which contained no 
threat to the profits and privileges of United States in­
vestors in Cuba? What colossal effrontery."^
On April 8, Federal immigration agents in Miami ar­
rested Roland Masferrer, a notorious Batista henchman, who 
had fled Cuba the same day as Batista. He had been picked 
up at the request of Dean Rusk who reported to Attorney 
General Robert F. Kennedy that his presence in this country 
was prejudicial to our national interest from the point of 
view of our foreign relations. Two days later Masferrer was 
indicted on charges of conspiring to outfit and send a mili­
tary expedition against Cuba--a violation of our neutrality 
laws. Louis J. Halle suggests that: "One possible reason
for Masferrer's arrest was that the administration believed 
that charging him with invading Cuba would divert suspicion 
from the government's own invasion plans, then in final 
stages of preparation."00
The question of the morality and legality of the in­
vasion resulted in much perturbation. The New Republic
5°MonthIy Review, May 1961, p. 5*
0oHalle, "Lessons of the Cuban Blunder," New 
Republic, June 5, 1961, p. 75>»
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said the action was a violation of our obligations under 
American treaties not to interfere in the affairs of our 
neighbors. It was a violation of international law, the 
United Nations charter, and the OAS charter, which states: 
"No state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly 
for any reason whatever in the internal affairs of anyz i -iother state." Arthur Larson, writing for the Saturday Re
view, puzzled over what had gone wrong in a country that
took pride in being the guardian of the law. He said this
country can learn a useful lesson from the experience if it
realizes that it can not get rid of violence by emulating
6)2violence or build a better world of law by flouting law.
The Monthly Review took a most extreme position, declaring:
The criminal nature and aims of the United States 
must be exposed . . . the American ruling class
must be taught that the world will no longer toler­
ate the re-imposition of imperial rule on a small 
country that has heroically won its indepencence 
and resolutely set its feet on the road to a bet­
ter, happier future. ^
Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, debated in­
wardly the morality of the act, the world response, the na­
tional response, and the Latin-American reaction. His con­
clusion was both unsound and misleading as he said: "Sup­
port of the invasion, could be distinguished from uninvited
Halle, "Lessons of the Cuban Blunder," New Repub­
lic , June 5) 1961, p. 75-
6)2"The Cuba Incident and the Rule of Law," Saturday 
Review, May 13, 1961, p . 27.
^ Monthly Review, May 1961, p. 5*
intervention" in the legal sense, because, "it was intended 
to test the will of the Cuban people, not to topple their 
government." Walter Lippmann, ironically, said: "It is
f
feasible, and in the practice of States it is not prohib­
ited to give clandestine help to Castro's opponents . . .
so long as it remains clandestine."^
The question is often asked how President Kennedy and 
his advisors had come to a decision to approve a venture so 
greatly misconceived. It goes back in part to the I960 
presidential election. Democratic candidate John Kennedy 
was calling loud attention to the danger at our doorstep. 
Clare Booth Luce quotes Kennedy as saying that Cuba was ev­
idence that United States security and leadership were slip­
ping away, and to "let Mr. Kruschev know that we are permit- 
ing no expansion of his foothold in our hemisphere. The 
New Republic said that the Kennedy administration thought 
of itself as an administration of dynamic action. This 
kind of action against Cuba fitted the New Frontier--the 
men in the inner ring dared not be anything but men of ac­
tion. So at the last dramatic meeting when the final deci­
sion was being made and each man was asked in turn to voice 
his opinion, it was difficult for any of them to disrupt 
the consensus that was being formed. This is the weakness
^Helen Fuller, Year of Trial: Kennedy's Crucial 
Decisions (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
1962), p. 58.
^Clare Booth Luce, "Our Global Double Bind," Life, 
October 5* 1962, p. 53*
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of bureaucracy--it is safer to be wrong with everyone else
LLthan to be right alone.00
One man who participated in the deliberations pleaded/
with the President not to approve the plan. That was Sena­
tor Fulbright of Arkansas. He spoke with firm conviction 
when he stated: "This sort of oblique attack on another 
Government is inherently immoral. . . . The wise course is 
not to try to overthrow Castro, but to work constructively 
elsewhere in Latin America." In his opinion, if we were to 
use armed force, we would have undone the work of thirty 
years in trying to live down earlier interventions. He 
repeated a phrase Kennedy used during the campaign: "The 
road to freedom runs through Rio and Buenos Aires and 
Mexico City." He then added this statement: "The Castro 
regime is a thorn in the flesh, but it is not a dagger in 
the heart." 1 In spite of his persuasion, Kennedy made 
the most unfortunate decision of his career--a decision 
for invasion.
There was another issue that was being questioned:
Was the plan as originally approved by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the administration militarily feasible? Many of
k^Halle, "Lessons of the Cuban Blunder," New Republic. 
June I4., 1961, p. 1L|_.
^Stewart Alsop, "Lessons of the Cuban Disaster," 
Saturday Evening Post, June 2I4., 1961, p. 26; Puller, Year 
of Trial: Kennedy's Crucial Decisions, p. 57; Karl E.
Meyer, Fulbright of Arkansas (Washington D. C.: Robert B. 
Luce, Inc., 1963), p . 196.
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the invaders insisted the plan was a masterful one. If
it had been carried out as designed, it would have suc- 
68ceeded. Fortune maintained that as a "tactical exercise,
f
it was well advised, daringly and successfully led, but
69the strategists at the White House plucked it apart."
The plan that was put into operation was different from
the plan as visualized by Eisenhower in many requisite ways.
Stewart Alsop wrote: "A peculiar, progressive watering
70down process had occured."
The original idea was to feed the recruits back into 
Cuba to reinforce the several thousand anti-Castro guer­
rillas already established in the mountains. Toward the 
fall, however, a more ambitious and riskier project came 
under consideration. It was to be a "one-shot" invasion 
to establish a beachhead for the expedition, to proclaim a 
provisional government, and to provide a rallying point for 
the discontented.
The first site selected for the landing was Trinidad. 
If the beachhead could not be held, anti-Castro forces had 
a "fail-back" position in the Escambray Mountains where the 
anti-Castro guerrillas were already operating. As Presi­
dent Kennedy began subtracting from the elements necessary
AftDOMario Lazo, "Decision for Disaster," Readers 
Digest, September 1961]., p. 263.
^Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," Fortune, 
September 1961, p. 92.
^°Stewart Alsop, "Lessons of the Cuban Disaster" 
Saturday Evening Post, June 2[|_, 1961, p. 26.
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to victory, the invasion site was switched from Trinidad 
to the Bay of Pigs.
Colonel Ramon Barquin, Ray’s military leader, and
f
others protested in vain against this choice of landing 
place. Barquin was one of the most highly regarded mili­
tary men among the exiles, and he knew Cuba as he knew his 
right hand. He pointed out that there were three narrow 
roads and a railroad bed leading out of the swamp, all con­
verging as they entered the central Cuban plain. Castro 
could concentrate his forces at this point and completely 
annihilate the rebel forces. Should any escape they could 
never make their way to the Escambray's a hundred miles 
away. ̂
The change may have had some advantage in that there 
would be little danger of shooting civilians--hardly any 
lived there. It was also thought that the landing there 
would be virtually unopposed and would appear to be an at­
tempt to resupply guerrillas.̂  This thought was appar­
ently based on wishful thinking--it is doubtful that there 
were guerrillas operating in this ares. A more important 
reason, however, was a political and foreign-policy concern 
over possible world reaction. Trinidad was too large a 
city for such an undertaking to evade widespread notice *7
^1Ibid.
72Ross and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. Ip6.
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7 3and avert the censure of world opinion. This fear of 
world opinion led to even more disastrous decisions.
Perhaps the most widely publicized criticism of the /
Cuban operation was the manner in which the White House 
handled the matter of air-strikes and air-cover. One of 
the essential elements of the plan was the use of air 
power. Castro's air force— consisting of four jet trainers, 
six to eight B-26's and several British Sea Furies--was to 
be destroyed on the ground in three air strikes by the Free 
Cuban Squadrons based in Nicaragua.^ Two of these were to 
take place before the invasion and the third was to coin­
cide with the invasion. Actually, the thought was that 
not until after Castro's planes were shot down would the 
landing forces hit the beaches. Air strike number one was 
to use all sixteen B-26 bombers in the rebel air squadron, 
but the State Department argued that this was too many 
planes to fit the pretense that the air strike was con­
ducted by defecting Castro pilots, so the number was there­
fore cut to eight.75
The first strike went off as planned, early Saturday 
morning, April 15. Its effectiveness was limited because it 
had to appear as if it was done by Castro's own pilots. No
73;gvans, The Politics of Surrender, p. 38I4..
7̂ 4-Ross and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. 20.
7^Lazo, "Decision for Disaster," Readers Digest, 
September 196J+, p. 2I4.6; Evans, The Politics of Surrender, 
p. 381;.
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napalm was used, and the planes had to fly from Nicaragua 
and return, leaving limited time for bomb runs. It did 
succeed, however, in giving rise to a great flurry in the
United Nations and elsewhere and as a result the United 
States participation in the entire enterprise was coming 
to the surface.^ As protests poured in, our image­
conscious planners began to get panicky. Stevenson, Rusk, 
and Bowles advised the cancellation of the second air 
strike. They argued that additional attacks would make it 
impossible to preserve the noninvolvement image of the 
United States.77 in the opinion of many, the lack of this 
air strike contributed most to the failure of the invasion. 
Castro’s planes were free to wreak havoc among the invad­
ers. Everything now depended upon the success of the third 
air strike, planned for the morning of the invasion.
Ross and Wise asked the question: "Could the Presi­
dent permit another B-26 air strike on Monday and still 
convince the world that somehow a new covey of Castro pi­
lots had defected from the Cuban Air Porce?^ The Presi­
dent decided he could not. He therefore called off the
/
76Soren son, Kennedy, p. 301.
77pight and Marzani, Cuba versus CIA, p. 33; Evans, 
The Politics of Surrender, p3 3^51 Sidey, John P. Kennedy, 
p. 129.
7®"How President Kennedy Upset the Cuban Invasion," 
United States News & World Report, February if, 1963? p. 29.
79rqss and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. 20.
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third air strike on which all hopes for the invasion de­
pended.
This was a staggering blow to the CIA. Bissell--
/
accompanied by Deputy Director Charles Cabell, an experi­
enced airman--went immediately to urge Rusk to reconsider a 
decision that, in its judgment, would put the enterprise in 
irretrievable peril. Rusk conferred with the President and
O  /''vthe answer was "no."ou Bissell returned to his office and 
flashed the word to Happy Valley, Nicaragua, where a small 
force of B-26s was sitting in readiness to take off for 
the Bay of Pigs. These were the planes of the invasion 
force, flown by Cuban pilots. They did not take off--their
O-iuse had been forbidden.
In the planning of the invasion an air strip was to 
be set up on the invasion beach where rebel planes could 
land and be refueled, so they could fly cover for the in­
vasion. Castro's air attacks prevented fuel from getting 
ashore so the air strip could not be used. This meant the 
anti-Castro planes had to fly back 700 miles to Nicaragua
to refuel, which gave them only a few minutes over the
Q 2beach. The result was no air cover.
^Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," Fortune, 
p. 93; Lasky, J. F. K., The Man and the Myth, p. £21.
nOJ"U.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks 
of Hon. Charles b7 Hoeven, 87th Cong. 2nd Sess., Â k-35*
82"ThQ Air Will Be Ours," United States News & World 
Report, February Ip, 1963, p. 29.
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When the invasion began and Castro's jets not only 
deciminated the Free Cuban Air Squadron but also sank two
freighters, Kennedy became alarmed. In the face of impend-/
ing, dismal failure, Bissell was told that the exile B-26s 
could attack Castro's airfields at will. A mission was 
then planned to take place on Monday night--the pilots were 
warned to avoid any risk to lives or civilian property.
The planes took off at 7:30 from Nicaragua and arrived over 
the target four hours later on a moonless night, with both 
the base and the nearby town blacked out and hidden by a 
low cloud ceiling. Not being able to distinguish their 
target, the pilots obeyed orders, and the mission returned 
without firing a shot or dropping a bomb.®^ United States 
News & World Report said that removing the restrictions on 
the invader's air force at this point "was like a surgical 
operation to save a man who had already died."^
Tuesday night, April 18, after a tortuous midnight 
meeting at which Bissell made it plain that unless United 
States air power was brought forward, the men on the beach 
were doomed, the President authorized air cover from the 
USS Boxer, for precisely one hour over the beaches. This 
would allow for the landing of supplies and for a strong 
strike by the exile air force. The plan collapsed when the
^"Lessons of the Cuban Disaster," Readers Digest, 
September 1961, pp. 1|_3 —74-8 -
%"The Air Will Be Ours," United States News & World 
Report, February 5? 1963? p. 20.
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exile B-26s arrived over the beaches ahead of schedule-- 
before the Boxer’s. jets had taken off.®^ The confusion 
over time was not surprising, considering the frequency of
changes in the basic plan. "When the Navy planes finally 
got off their carrier," wrote Drew Pearson, "their only 
contribution to freedom was to help Castro--they shot down 
a rebel B-26."®^ Rebel planes had the same markings as 
Castro's, except for some distinctive markings underneath, 
and the Navy pilots not being able to see under the wing, 
destroyed the rebel B-26.
The disputes following the invasion failure center­
ing on the decisions made during these tragic hours rankled 
Robert F. Kennedy. He said that he was certain that "Pres­
ident Kennedy never withdrew United States air cover--there 
never were any plans made for United States air cover, so 
there was nothing to w i t h d r a w . T h i s  statement stands in 
contradiction to what the invasion forces had been led to 
believe. Verona said he went to the "Freedom Fighters" 
training base in Guatemala and spoke to the American com­
mander who stated: "Don't worry, we will have complete 
control of the air, and Castro won't be able to move a sin­
gle car or truck any place in Cuba." When asked if he was
^■^Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter, p. 270.
®^Drew Pearson, Grand Forks Herald, May 6, 1961,
p. 1+.
87"The Air Will Be Ours," United States News & World 
Report, February I4., 1963? p. 29.
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certain this was an American promise, he stated: "The 
promise came from an American placed there by the Ameri­
can government. He had to have authority. I believed in
/him." Dagoberto Darias, commander of a transport ves­
sel in the Cuban invasion, said he received an American 
promise of air support. "It came," he said, "in a radio­
gram from the American flagship directing our opera­
tions."88
/ / sOn January 11, 1962, Jose Perez San Roman, commander 
of the defeated brigade, made a trip to Washington to is­
sue a statement from Attorney General Robert Kennedy's of­
fice. In the statement he flatly denied that the invasion 
forces had ever been promised air support from the United 
States Government.89 San Roman, nicknamed Pepe, was pro­
bably the most important person participating in the inva­
sion, and was certainly in a position to make known the 
truth. The following excerpts are from a transcription of 
radio messages from the Bay of Pigs to the home base, where 
Americans were in charge. These messages signed by Pepe 
San Rom^n contradict the statements made in the Attorney 
General's office. "2AW to Air Command: Where is our jet 
cover? Pepê . To Base: Do you people realize how desper­
ate the situation is? Pepd. To Air Commander: Where is 
promised air cover? Pepe. (Italics mine.) Ken Thompson
88Ibid.
89Ibid., p . 33•
of the Dallas Morning News said: "San Roman's statement
Eo the Attorney Generajp bms become extremely useful in 
what appears to be an obvious campaign to rewrite history
and to absolve the administration of its share of the blame 
for the fiasco.
In retrospect, the debate over the issue of air
strikes and air cover was wasted activity. Even with air
superiority, it is a question whether the 1^00 men landed
at the Bay of Pigs could have withstood Castro's assault.
He had available a 30,000-man army, besides his militia--
a force totalling a quarter of a million men. They were
equipped with the newest weapons from Russia and Czecho-
91Slovakia, which included tanks, cannon, and howitzers.
When news of the invasion reached Castro he was in
Havana. It came as no surprise--his agents in Miami had
been reporting to him for months that an expeditionary
force was being readied and equipped. At least a hundred
known Castro intelligence agents circulated freely in the
buildup area. Their photographs were on file in the Dade
County, Florida, sheriff's office, but no effort was made
92by Federal authorities to remove them from the scene.
90Ken Thompson, "Contradictions on Air Cover," Dallas 
(Texas) Morning News, February 5? 1963-
^Thayer, Guerrilla, p. 12.
92"The Invasion That Could Not Succeed," Reporter,
May 11, 1961, p. 22; James Reston, stated in the New York 
Times, May 2, 1961: "The only people who knew very little 
about what was happening. . . were the American people who




On March i|, Castro's newspaper Revolucion, devoted almost
the entire issue to news stories and photographs of the
preparations being made in the rebel camps and airfields in
Florida and in Central America. Castro, in speaking
about the first air strike, said:
We knew that the air raid was not just a harass­
ment but a military operation designed to des­
troy our air force. Therefore we figured the 
aggression would come soon. . . . Tactically
speaking, the air raid was an error because it 
gave us a chance to take measures. We mobilized 
all combat units.95
Some tactical errors came under close scrutiny and 
criticism. For example, to have loaded all the signal 
equipment, the greater part of the ammunition, and the high 
command (Manuel Artime) in a single vessel was a military 
error. Castro had ordered his half dozen planes to ignore 
the landing force and concentrate on the invasion fleet. 
Early in the action the Houston was hit by a rocket and 
grounded; a little later a Sea Fury, diving out of the sun, 
made a direct hit on the Rio Escondido which carried the 
supplies for the first ten days of fighting--ammunition, 
food, hospital equipment, and gasoline. Haynes Johnson was 
of the opinion that even had the Houston and the Rio Escon­
dido gotten ashore, it is again a question whether it would 
have made a crucial difference in the one-sided struggle. 
Pepe/ San Roman, the brigade commander, said they might
^ Revolucion, March 5» 1961.
9^-Monahan and Gilmore, The Great Deception, p. 111.
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have succeeded with 15,000 men instead of 1,500. ^
When the White Paper on Cuba was published, it 
clearly indicated that the American Government was well
aware of the magnitude of Cuba's military build up. It 
seems incredible that the overthrow, with such a small 
force, was even attempted. The question is often asked:
Why did the United States choose this particular time for 
the invasion? Ross and Wise expressed the opinion that 
President Kennedy and his administration "were tasting the 
wine of victory and of power. The young energetic admin­
istration suffered from a bad case of overconfidence."^6 
Most studies of the period reveal the following reasons for 
the invasion at this time: Allegedly, Castro was to re­
ceive, early in 1961, substantial deliveries of Soviet jet 
fighters and that Cuban pilots to man them were being 
trained in Czechoslovakia; the Guatemala government was 
threatening to throw the "Freedom Fighters" out of its 
country--President Ydigoras was under considerable pressure 
at home because of the camps; and the rebel army was grow­
ing restive--it would be impossible to sustain the morale 
of the exiles if they did not get into action. Thayer 
pointed out another, and probably more likely factor: "The 
customary impatience of the American public, particularly 
those who owned property in Cuba, must have put heavy
^Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs, p. 113.
^Ross and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. 35.
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pressure on the Americans who were dealing with the sit­
uation.
The Kennedy administration had strained hard to con-
t
vince the world that it did not plan to commit United 
States military forces. The story in Washington was that 
the attempt to overthrow Castro was entirely a Cuban af­
fair. Many Americans, nevertheless, took part. American 
frogmen scouted Cuban beaches in advance of attack--one 
American frogman was with the Cuban underwater teams that 
went ashore with the brigade. On the third day of the in­
vasion four American pilots were killed in B-26 bombers 
over Cuba. Navy jets with insignias obliterated were all 
lined up and ready to go on air strips at Key West, Flo­
rida .
Why did United States involvement in the invasion 
come as a surprise to Americans when the whole world, in­
cluding Cuba, seemed to have full knowledge of it? The Cu­
ban radio was broadcasting all about the rebel camps, and 
the United States government's part in them, weeks before 
they were discussed in the American newspapers. According 
to Light and Marzani: "Few stories have been more grossly
^Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 295; Tully, The Inside Story, 
p. 251; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 239; Wallace Carrol 
New York Times, April 21, 196T, p . 23; Theodore Draper, 
Castro's Revolucion (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 
p. 90; Fuller, Year of Trial, p. 52.
"Bay of Pigs: The Curtain is Lifting," United 
States News & World Report, March 11, 1963, p. 3^7
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mishandled--the story was there for all to see but the 
editors chose to wear blinders.n<̂  The Nation, in an
editorial on November 19, I960, presented the story by Doc-/
tor Ronald Hilton of Stanford University, in which he de­
scribed the CIA’s activities in Guatemala as it was re­
ported on the front page of La Hora, Guatemala's leading 
newspaper. The issue containing the editorial, together 
with a copy of a news release based on the editorial, were 
distributed to all major news media. The dispatch of the 
releases was followed by telephone calls to various news 
desks.
The reactions were puzzling. Jesse Gordon said the 
Associated Press was called three times: Each time a dif­
ferent man answered, professed interest in the story, but 
said he hadn't seen either the release or a proof of the 
editorial. Could duplicates be sent immediately?" Three 
duplicates in as many hours were sent, but nothing happened 
--someone in the AP hierarchy squelched the story. It was
not used by either the AP or the United Press Interna-
.. n 101 txonal.
A few days later Francis L. McCarty, head of the UPI 
Latin America service's desk, when asked, stated that there
^Light and Marzani, Cuba versus CIA, p. 38.
■'"^Victor Bernstein and Jesse Gordon, "The Press and 
the Bay of Pigs," The Columbia University Forum, Fall 1967* 
(not page numbered).101Ibid.
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was a big base in operation in Guatemala, but the Pentagon
denied any knowledge of it and the State Department said,
"no comment." He went on to say, one story had it, that
102this was to be a replacement for Guantanamo.
The November 20th New York Times reported an inter-
/view with Guatemala's President Miguel Ydigoras in which 
he was asked about a "base" established with United States 
assistance as a training ground for military action against 
Cuba. He branded any such report a lie--the base was to be 
used by the Guatemalan Army for training in guerrilla war- 
fare to guard against invasions.  ̂ The AP also inter­
viewed Ydigoras and received the same story. Both corre­
spondents chose to interview the one man who would be cer­
tain to deny the story. Fundamental rules of reporting 
should have dictated that they at least check with the La 
Hora reporter who wrote the original story, or if it was 
common knowledge as Dr. Hilton reported, they could have 
talked with any man on the street.
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, not satisfied with the 
AP report, sent its own man, Richard Dudman, into Guatemala. 
He stayed clear of the Presidential Palace and got his an­
swers from the public. He was told of a secret air-strip, 
and that many of the soldiers there spoke with a "Cuban ac­
cent." Mr. Dudman had censorship difficulties and had to
102Ibid.
-*-93]flew York Times, November 20, I960, p. 32.
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post his story in neighboring El Salvador. The following 
editorial from the Post-Dispatch should have awakened the 
nations’ press:
What is going on in Guatemala? Who is trying to 
conceal what, and for what purpose? Why should 
Richard Dudman . . . have to go to neighboring 
El Salvador to send a dispatch to this newspaper 
about what he found in Guatemala?10^
About the middle of December the Los Angeles Mirror 
sent its aviation editor, Don Dwiggins, to Guatemala to 
find out what was taking place. He told of air base con­
struction and airstrips in which American funds were in­
volved. He questioned why Guatemala's air-force consist­
ing of a few war weary and corroding surplus fighters 
would need a jet airstrip for military use. An anti-Castro 
pilot told him of an air-raid operation scheduled for 
early 1961, and that people high up in the American govern­
ment were offering $25,000 for pilots to fly the mission.
The sum of all these stories should have convinced the 
nation's press that United States was involved in a clan­
destine operation against Cuba.10^
On January 3, when the United States broke relations 
with Castro, the New York Times said, the action was taken 
because we had finally lost patience with the propaganda 
offensive from Havana, charging the United States with plans 
for invasion, but ignored Castro's charge that the embassy
i
Pigs,
^^Bernstein and Gordon, "The Press and the Bay of 
" The Columbia University Forum, Pall 1967.
105Ibid.
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was being used as an espionage center. The Times inferred 
that the purpose of the anti-American propaganda was to 
divert minds that would be preoccupied with dissatisfaction 
at home.10^
Paul Kennedy, Latin American correspondent for the 
New York Times, sent a dispatch that was printed on January 
10 in which he described the build-up in Guatemala, using 
American facilities, material, and personnel. He did not 
identify the guerrillas under training or clarify the pur­
pose. The article was very circumspect, yet, this was the 
story that at a later date was pointed to by President Ken­
nedy as an example of "premature disclosures of security 
information.
The country as a whole now became aware of something 
peculiar going on in Guatemala. Still unmentioned was the 
CIA involvement that Dr. Hilton had earlier suggested. Be­
ginning on January 8, the New York Daily News began a se­
ries of articles on these activities. Quoted was Manuel 
Varona, saying: "Our invasion force will land in Cuba.
. . . A provisional government will be set up . . . which
will restore all property to the rightful owners." The 
Daily News suggested that financing was coming from Cuban 
and American industrial interests who hoped to get their
-t-ÔNew York Times, January 8, 1961, p. 15.
Ibid., January 10, 1961, p. 12.
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property back.-*-®®
The Miami editors, who were not unaware of what was 
going on but had suppressed the story, now decided there
was no longer any point in withholding it. The day after 
the Times broke with their story on Guatemala the Miami 
Herald published full information on invasion activities.* 10® 
The story continued to expand, and Washington, now aware 
that they could not stop speculation, began to leak stories 
to the press tending to justify the pending invasion. On 
April ip, Tad Szulc, Latin American correspondent for Time, 
told the whole story, linking the CIA with the invasion 
that was now imminent.
President Kennedy, at a press meeting, shortly after 
the Bay of Pigs had turned to dismal history, criticized 
what he considered premature disclosures. He was particu­
larly critical of the New York Times, but at the same time 
said that he wished they had, "printed more about the opera­
tion, you would have saved us from a colossal mistake."
James Reston was certain that any amount of disclosure at 
this time would not have helped. By the time the American 
people were fully aware of what was taking place the plans 
were beyond aborting. The time for arousing public opposi­
tion was back in October, I960. The persistency with which
10®New York Daily News, January 8, 1961, p. 12.
10®Bernstein and Gordon, "The Press and the Bay of 
Pigs," The Columbia University Forum, Fall 1967*
I
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the American press ignored the story still seems incred­
ible. Actually there was no security to breach--Castro had 
complete information on all details. Bernstein and Gordon 
wrote:
The early apathy of the press makes sense only 
when viewed as motivated not so much by patri­
otic reticence as by eager jingoistic collab­
oration. The fact is that most powerful Amer­
ican publishers wanted Castro out. . . .  So 
they kept silent until a few independent souls 
precipitated the news competition. . . . But
the damage had already been done: public opinion 
had been eliminated as a factor in a major for­
eign policy decision. ^  (italics mine.)
Apparently there were no press reporters accompany­
ing the invasion forces. All information was put out in 
the name of the Cuban Revolutionary Council by press re­
leases dictated by CIA to the firm of Lem Jones Associates, 
Inc., of New York, hired for the purpose. The result was 
a farce. On the basis of these news releases, headlines 
throughout the nation recounted mass uprisings against 
Castro, Soviet MIGs and Soviet submarines blasting the in­
vaders, Cuban Navy in revolt, while all this time the in­
vading force was being destroyed by Castro forces. The Am­
erican press was deliberately fed u n t r u t h s . T h e  New
•^^Ibid.
~^^Ibid. On April 19, a dispatch was forwarded by a 
Times correspondent at Guantanamo Bay, which states: "The 
sensitive radar on Navy ships picked up no trace of high­
speed Cuban or communist aircraft, nor have any foreign 
submarines been sighted by the Navy." Officials were con­
fident that there were no MIG fighters in the area of Cuba.
284807
8^
York Times said that the press had been debased for the 
government's purpose. In an editorial on May 10, it was 
firmly stated: /
A democracy, . . our democracy, . . cannot be 
lied to. This is one of the factors that make 
it more precious, more difficult, and yet es­
sentially stronger than any other form of gov­
ernment in the world. . . .  A dictatorship can 
get along without an informed public opinion, 
a democracy cannot.H2
There was tragedy in the invasion failure, but after 
the smoke of battle had cleared and after sober thought 
there were many who felt that the failure was not as tragic 
as it seemed. The Hon. Thomas Pelley stated: "That the 
present effort has apparently failed in no way diminished 
the gallantry of the attempt 3 An editorial in the 
Washington Post, in attempting to justify the invasion, rea­
soned that giving physical and moral support on this oc­
casion was not an evasion of American principles, or of 
international commitments. It was no different from the 
English and French situation in Suez.* 1-^
There were many, however, who felt that the prestige 
of the United States had been seriously damaged. "We Am­
ericans," wrote C. L. Sulzberger in the New York Times,
-'■■'-̂ James Reston, "The President and Press, the Old 
Dilemma," New York Times, May 10, 1961, p. Ip8.
1-L̂ U. S., Congressional Record, Hon. Thomas Pelley, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, 6529.
^ ^ Washington Post, April 25 > 1961, p. ip.
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"look like fools to our friends, rascals to our enemies, 
and incompetent to the rest."1-*-̂ Readers Digest said:
"The invasion shocked the American people and damaged our i-j -| Lleadership and prestige throughout the world." The
Nation emphasized that it was a serious breach of national 
and international law.-'--1-̂  Newsweek reported: "At best, 
the United States appears before the world as a meddler, at 
worst as a nation which pretends to virtue yet seems to•j 1 Qhave committed open aggression against a tiny nation."
Time described the rejoicing in Cuba: "On Havana 
street corners groups of prancing militiamen fired their 
Czech burp guns into the air, and jeeps draped with hot­
eyed youths careened along the avenues, communist country 
correspondents were hustled to the beachhead to view the 
wreckage of invasion--United States-made mortars, trucks, 
recoilless rifles, machine guns, etc."11  ̂ Castro's April 
21, Revolucion, devoted the entire issue to showing cap­
tured American equipment, and the April 22 issue featured
-̂-̂ New York Times, May 5> 1961, p. 58.
H^Lazo, "Decision for Disaster," Readers Digest, 
September I96I4., p. 2I4.I.
g. Smith, "Bay of Pigs: Unanswered Questions," 
Nation, April 13, I96I4., p. 360.
Il8"cuba: The Consequences," Newsweek, May 1, 1961,
p. 23.
119"Bitter Week: Cuban Invasion," Time, April 28, 
1961, pp. 11-13.
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several pages of messages, letters, and date-line reports 
from all over the world indicating support and sympathy for 
Cuba. Pravda said that the United States was trying to< 
pursue Theodore Roosevelt's "big stick" policy. "Today ob­
viously it is not the biggest and longest . . . the other
side has just as long’ and not less weighty sticks." India 
deplored United States intervention. Rio de Janeiro re­
ported: "Whatever may be the result of the battle, we
should make clear our support for Cuba's legitimate dem­
ocratic objectives." In Caracas, the Venezuelan legisla­
ture unanimously condemned "any armed intervention in Cuba 
or in any other country."
American news media also told of world reaction. 
Newsweek reported: "Within twenty-four hours of the anti- 
Castro invasion the news had swept around the world . . .
touching off a global surge of anti-Americanism communist 
protest meetings staged in Moscow, Peking, and satellite 
countries,"^21 There was a good deal of undisguised pleas­
ure in England, as told by Esquire, at the discomfiture of 
122the CIA. Life found that among neutrals and even among
friends the reaction was adverse. NATO nations exhibited *1
^^^Revolucion, April 21 and 22, 1961.
1 PI "Cuba: The Consequences” Newsweek, May 1, 1961,
p. 25.
122M. Muggeridge, "Bay of Pigs," Esquire, September 
196U-, p. 71.
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both scorn and dismay at the bungling.* 12-̂ Wallace Carrol, 
writing for the New York Times, reported that the "old feel­
ing of 'yankee' intervention was stirred in the hemisphere, 
and a division occured among delegations of the American 
Republics at the United Nations," yet, "there was a great 
deal of support in Latin America and a great deal more that 
did not come to the surface." Many leaders did not pub­
licly back the invasion for fear of rousing leftist senti­
ment, but actually hoped that the Castro regime soon would 
fall.12^
The Cuban invasion was a horribly costly lesson; 
but it was well learned. In later months the President's 
father would tell him that "in its perverse way, the Bay of 
Pigs was not a misfortune but a benefit." This was small 
consolation, but no one can doubt that failure in Cuba in 
1961 contributed to a firmer policy that brought about the 
removal of missile bases in 1962.^2p But if the United 
States policy in Latin America is represented only in the 
word "firmness" then it has not learned the lesson well.
123”Bitter Fruits of Defeat," Life, April 28, 1961, 
pp. 22-23.
12^Carrol, New York Times, April 21, 1961, p.
12^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 297.
CHAPTER IV
Midwest Response
The press in the Midwest appeared to be quite unaware 
of any unusual activity leading to intervention in Cuba un­
til after the failure. This was no doubt a reflection of 
the lack of coverage of the story by the national news re­
porting services and the big city dailies. However, the 
Jamestown Sun and the Grand Forks Herald did report, early 
in April, on secret military camps in the Canal zone whose 
purpose it was to train Cubans in guerrilla and anti­
guerrilla tactics, and the accusation by Raul Roa, Cuba’s 
minister to the United Nations that the United States was 
directing an invasion plot against Cuba. There was also 
a report of the announcement made by Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, 
President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council of a "second 
war of liberation," to overthrow Castro.^ The Minneapolis 
Tribune expressed its unhappiness over a situation in which 
the people who knew least about what was happening in the 
early stages of the exercise were the American people who 
were paying the bill. It was in hopes, however, that the 
attempt to overthrow Castro would succeed, but suggested 
that should it succeed, the varying and conflicting
1James town Sun, April 10, 1961, p. 2; Grand Forks 
Herald, April 10, 1961, p. 1+.88
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political views held by the participating groups in the 
anti-Castro front..might be a problem for any post-
prevolutionary government that took over.
The "post-mortems" in the Midwest were similar to 
the national response, but milder and in most cases more 
constructive. The Mandan Pioneer was opposed to any temp­
tation to find a scapegoat but wondered how it came about 
that the CIA so grossly miscalculated the Cuban situation. 
The nation, it believed, must guard against giving too 
much responsibility to any federal intelligence agency, and 
while the CIA has its place it should not be in a position 
to formulate top-level policy. The Pioneer was happy to 
know that President Kennedy had ordered an investigation of 
the CIA and hoped that the United States would not again be 
caught off base because of poor intelligence.8 The Devils 
Lake Daily Journal called attention to an aspect of the CIA 
which few people realize: that it is the only governmental 
agency which does not have to submit its expenses to any 
accounting except the chief executive's. "Through the 
years the CIA has been able to cloak its inefficiency from 
all eyes but those of the President. Its failures," it 
commented, "put serious dents in American prestige."^- The 
Jamestown Sun made the suggestion that the CIA should be
^Minneapolis Tribune, April 18, 1961, p. Ip.
^Mandan Pioneer, April 28, 1961, p. Ip, and May 5?
1961, pTT^
-̂Devils Lake Daily Journal, May 9, 1961, p. Ip.
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overhauled both in method and personnel. In its opinion 
the organization had too many "political philosophers" who 
do their own evaluation and too few ordinary spies who pro-i
vide data without evaluation. Nothing would appease the 
American people more than the reorganization of the CIA and 
the State Department and the elimination of those who had 
caused the confusion.-^ The Albert Lea (Minnesota) Evening 
Tribune said that the agency should forget its "cloak and 
dagger" business and depend more on scientific techniques, 
favoring the idea as in Britain that intelligence and spe­
cial operations should be handled by separate agencies.^
The guerrilla-training operation was criticized by the 
Minot Daily News because the United States had never been 
equipped for that kind of warfare, and certainly the CIA 
had no capabilities in this area. It should confine it­
self to information gathering and be relieved of all such 
responsibility, for guerrilla warfare was largely a mil­
itary problem.^
When Senator McCarthy of Minnesota introduced a res­
olution in the Senate suggesting that the CIA should come 
under the scrutiny of the elected branch of the government, 
under a "watchdog" committee, the Waterloo (Iowa) Courier 
took issue with him, contending, that of all the things
^ James town Sun, April 28, 1961, and May 8, 1961, p. I)..
6Albert Lea (Minnesota) Evening Tribune, May Iq, 1961,
p. iq.
^Minot Daily News, April 28, 1961, p. iq.
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wrong with CIA it could not conceive of a single one being 
corrected by a "Watchdog" committee. Every other intelli­
gence service in the world operated in complete secrecy , 
which was necessary also for the American agency if it were 
to fulfill its functions. The Courier further pointed out 
that an intelligence agency was expected to carry out mis­
sions which the government could repudiate. How could the 
government repudiate something an official Congressional
Q
committee had been supervising?
There were political overtones in the comments made 
by the Albert Lea Evening Tribune. In its April 26 issue 
it called attention to Kennedy's scornful dismissal of 
the Eisenhower-Nixon effort to contain Cuba's "mad-man," 
but it was happy that Kennedy had swallowed his fierce 
pride and it called on Eisenhower to give him aid in rally­
ing the citizens of the nation behind his administration. 
The editorial in the May 15 issue stated:
There is a vast reservoir of resentment against 
the cockiness of the Hew Frontiersmen exhibited 
during the campaign. They had a fine contempt 
for Eisenhower's policies at containment of com­
munism and the more these conceited young men 
flounder, the wiser Eisenhower, Nixon and com­pany appear.9
The Dickinson Press registered disapproval of the 
administration not seriously considering the consequences 
of failure. It wanted "to keep its cake and eat it too."
O°WaterIoo (Iowa) Courier, May 1$, 1961, p. !(..
9Albert Lea Evening Tribune, May 1%, 1961, p_. Ij..
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In pursuit of a "tight-rope" course which sought to assist 
the assault, but manage it in a manner to keep its part se­
cret, it doomed the enterprise from the start.10 1 The Press
i
had been more conciliatory in an earlier statement that we 
should rid ourselves of the idea that "we as proud Ameri­
cans must be best in everything we undertake, the idea 
that when we do fail, the blame must inevitably fall upon 
some sharply visible villain--a man or an agency."11 The 
Minot Daily News registered disappointment that the Presi­
dent had not been protected by the "new hands" Walt Rostow, 
McGeorge Bundy, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Dean Rusk 
against the bad advice of the "old hands" Richard Bissell 
and Allen Dulles of CIA, General Lyman Lemnitzer and 
Admiral Arleigh Burke of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Adolfe 
Berle in the State Department. The Mankato (Minnesota) 
Free Press commented on this, saying that any attempt to 
blame a single group--including the liberal-minded intel- 
lectuals--was allowing "prejudice to overcome sound judge­
ment."1-̂ The facts indicated that the older men had erred 
just as disastrously as had the younger men. The Press 
made no verbal attacks on Kennedy personally, and the 
criticism directed at the administration was not very
10Dickinson Press, May l8, 1961, p. L|_.
11Ibid., May 2, 1961, p. l±.
^ Minot Daily News, May ip, 1961, p. 2.
^Mankato (Minnesota) Free Press, May 6, 1961, p. 10.
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severe. When Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall in 
a television interview charged President Eisenhower with 
responsibility for the Cuban Invasion, saying it had been 
planned under him, the Bismarck Tribune was severe in its 
challenge. In its opinion, Udall was a "so-so" congressman 
until he joined the cabinet, and now "came a cropper" when 
he attempted to place responsibility for the fiasco on the 
shoulders of Dwight D. Eisenhower. If such contention 
were correct, Kennedy would not appear as a very "strong" 
president, for he would be conceding that "Ike and Dick" 
continued to be in charge. ̂
On the question of the value and use of the Cuban un­
derground, the Grand Forks Herald predicted that once the 
invasion was underway and leadership thereby given to re­
sistance groups, there would be greatly increased defec­
tions from the Castro government. The report from an un­
derground leader insisted that his organization had more 
than 15,000 dues-paying members in Havana province alone. 
Later, when this defection did not occur, the Herald said 
Castro had time to arrest and scatter those who might have 
served as leaders, and an uprising around the provinces and 
cities would be extremely difficult.-^ In a later issue 
the conclusion had been reached that a large segment of *1
-̂ Bismarck Tribune, May 3, 1961, p. 1+.
1^Grand Porks Herald, April 16, 1961, p. L|_, and April 
20, 1961, p. 1±-
9k
the Cuban people were sold on Castro's propaganda and land 
reform, particularly the landless peasant who could have 
been the biggest asset to a revolutionary force who, when 
he was given or promised land, became a firm Castro sup­
porter.^ The Jamestown Sun submitted that the peasant who 
helped feed Castro's guerrilla fighters when he was waging 
war against Batista would not be likely to help overthrow 
him. Other segments of the Cuban society would also be 
watching the progress of the drive against Castro to see 
if the big foreign estates were to be returned to their 
owners, and if the bathing beaches would once again be re­
served for the elite of Havana and rich American tourists. 
If this were proposed, the uprising would not get much sup­
port inside Cuba.1  ̂ Considering the limited strength of 
the anti-Castro forces which landed in Cuba, the Saint Paul 
Pioneer Press expressed the opinion that the success of 
the invasion attempt had to rely on support from the Cuban 
population. It placed the blame on CIA for giving incom­
plete reports and convincing the administration that pop- 
ular support would be forthcoming. "How could it be," 
wrote the Minneapolis Tribune, "that this organization with 
all its access to Cuba and to the friendly nations in this
l^ibid. , April 22, 1961, p. k-
17Jamestown Sun, April lip, 1961, p. i|.
l^Saint Paul Pioneer Press, April 23, 1961, p. 6.
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hemisphere, could be so sure the Cubans would revolt, and 
be so wrong on this critical point. . . ."19 The Dickinson
Press registered disappointment in the CIA which, because 
of a lack of trust, did not inform the Cuban underground 
when the invasion was to take place and also held members 
of the top revolutionary council Incommunicado while issu­
ing statements in their name.20 The Valley City Times de­
clared that the United States intelligence was faulty in 
its reports on how much armament Fidel Castro had and also 
on the likelihood of a hoped-for uprising. "It is easy for 
Americans," it said, "with their distaste for dictatorship 
to think that because they despise Castro, all Cubans 
do."21
Opinions on the issues of the morality and legality, 
the right and wrong, of the involvement, were quite 
equally divided. The Waterloo Daily Courier took rather 
a militant stand, premised on the belief that the neu­
trality act and certain aspects of the Pan-American treaty 
did not adequately cover the existing situation. If we 
were prohibited from any action to help our friends, 
then we were in a desperate state indeed. It stated:
"What the communists take by force of arms may rightly 
be taken from them by force of arms, any other doctrine
^ Minneapolis Tribune, April 22, 1961, p. [|_.
20pickinson Press, May 18, 1961, p. l+.
21yalley City Times, April 2i|_, 1961, p. 2 and April
26, 1961, p. 2.
perpetuates the communists in power and guarantees our de­
feat. "22 The Fairmont (Minnesota) Sentinel declared that 
if we are to survive in the world of today we may have to
t
revise a doctrine which says "we will never start a war or 
fire that first shot. We must dare to take a stand for 
what we know to be right, as our forefathers did before 
us,n23 The Red Wing (Minnesota) Republican Eagle expressed 
the philosophy that as long as Uncle Sam was being blamed 
for everything that happened to Castro anyway, this nation 
would lose nothing by offering something besides mere sym­
pathy to the Cuban people. 2̂ - The only course left open to 
us, declared the Albert Lea Evening Tribune, was to "risk 
war if we want peace. The thickening crust of communism 
can no longer be laughed away. What this all means, of 
course, is that we must now drop our 'holier-than-thou' dip­
lomatic pose and admit to the world that we are prepared to 
destroy those who seek to destroy us."25 The Bismarck Tri­
bune thought it was perhaps time for the United States to 
show that it would not hesitate to shoot if it had to. The 
United States being the seat and strength of freedom, it *2
^ Waterloo Daily Courier, April li|, 1961, p. i|_.
2 3 Fa irmont (Minnesota) Sentinel, April 21, 1961.
2̂ 4-Red Wing (Minnesota) Republican Eagle, April 21,
1961.
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2j?Albert Lea Evening Tribune, April 2b., 1961, p.
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declared, "it is responsible for the failures, and has 
the obligation to restore the successes. D
Serious misgivings were voiced with any plan which 
might result in overt action. The Laramie (Wyoming) Daily 
Boomerang asked: "Is this country operating on a double 
standard? How can it preach non-intervention in the United 
Nations and then aid in an uprising against Cuba?" It 
went on to say that no matter how repugnant the Castro re­
gime might be, direct force must not be used against it.
As a nation we "must practice what we preach. "27 The same 
theme was stressed by the Saint Paul Pioneer Press, saying 
that since this nation, along with other members of the 
OAS, had signed a resolution against intervention, it now 
had a responsibility to maintain a "hands off" policy.28 
The Minot Daily News said: "Thoughtful Americans fear 
United States involvement and the consequences that might 
spring from it." Such involvement would damage relation­
ships with other Latin-American governments and provide 
tremendous new impetus for the cries of "Yankee Imperial­
ism." The long range aims of democracy would not be well 
served in this manner.29 The Fargo Forum expressed sym­
pathy for both anti-Batista and anti-Castro forces, but said
2£>Bismarck Tribune, April 22, 1961, p. Iq.
27Lauamie_ (Wyoming) Daily Boomerang, April 23, p. iq.
28gajnt Paul Pioneer Press, April 15, 1961, p. Jq.
29Minot Daily News, April 19, 1961, p. Iq.
that the United States forces must not take part in an is­
land invasion.30 The Brainerd (Minnesota) Dispatch and the 
Winona (Minnesota) Daily News strongly urged that the 
United States not interfere in an affair that, for all its 
international implications, was essentially the business of 
the Cuban people.31 The United States government does not 
want Castro to win, stated the Des Moines (Iowa) Register, 
yet, direct intervention would violate pledges made by two 
presidents and would place premier Kruschev in a position 
in which he would have to "welsh1' on his promises to Cuba 
or take counter action by force of arms.32 The Sioux Falls 
(South Dakota) Argus Leader said substantially the same 
thing. It was certain that Russia would not just sit still 
while the United States was invading Cuba, and aside from 
that, how could the United States say to the mid-American 
and the South American nations that it was its right to de­
termine the rulerships of Cuba.33 The Mankato Free Press 
took a like position but wanted the world to know that when 
the President took a firm stand against interference in 
Cuba he was reflecting American opinion, and stressed that 
though we did not want trouble, "we didn't intend to be
30pargo Forum, April 19, 1961, p. 1|.
3lBrainerd (Minnesota) Dispatch, April 21, 1961; 
Winona (Minnesota) Daily News, April 21, 1961.
32Des Moines (Iowa) Register, April 19, 1961, p. l8.





It seemed to the Minneapolis Tribune that anything 
the United States did would be judged wrong. The failure 
to unseat the Castro regime was being judged as a "blow to 
our prestige," but so would the continued existence of a 
pro-communist government at our very doorstep. It would 
not have enhanced our prestige if we had rejected the pleas 
of anti-Castro forces for help, and if Castro had toppled 
at first blow, we still would be under attack in many parts 
of the world.33 The Mandan Pioneer had a different slant 
to its observation. The Washington leadership of the free 
world, it declared, had not been undermined, and the de­
cline in its prestige, if any, would come from misinter­
pretations of what happened. If the invaders had been di­
rectly aided by United States forces and then suffered de­
feat, it continued, one could properly conclude that the 
event was a blow to this nation's prestige, but this was 
not the c a s e . i n  like manner, the Williston Herald said 
that it was ridiculous to suggest, as Castro had charged, 
that any United States land, sea, or air forces were in­
volved. Had they been, the outcome would have been dif­
ferent, "as any informed person would know."37
34Mankato Free Press, April 21, 1961, p. JL|_.
^ Minneapolis Tribune, April 23, 1961, p. 2.
3^Mandan Pioneer, April 27, 1961, p. [)..
37williston Herald, April 23, 1961, p. I4..
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After the invasion failure, anti-United States com­
ments were heard from friend and foe alike. The Waterloo 
Sunday Courier in an apparently angry protest said: "The 
United States would not have endured any more criticism for 
sending marines into Cuba than it had already received for 
not preventing the invasion." It believed that: "it was 
probably time now to apply the fundamental rule of self- 
preservation and accept whatever loss in good will would be 
involved to protect this hemisphere against communism."38 
The Jamestown Sun, however, pointed out that we ourselves 
had sharply criticized our handling of the abortive Cuban 
affair, we could hardly be surprised that our allies had 
voiced their own complaints about it. It went on to say 
that possibly the Cuban fiasco, for all its mismanagement, 
may have done more to alert Latin America to communist 
peril than anything else that might have happened.39 
The Bismarck Tribune attacked outside criticism by saying 
that, had the Cuban Freedom Fighters succeeded, President 
Kennedy would have been written off in the biased history 
of the neutralist and leftists as an "American imperialist." 
The inference being that, "a weak United States is 'pro­
gressive'; a strong United States is 'imperialist'." 3
38Wa terloo Sunday Courier, May 30, 1961, p. 8.
39 James town Sun, May 11, 1961, p. 1+.
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It continued by saying that perhaps American prestige would 
be better served by a little more "muscle" and a little 
less talk, during the months ahead.
Ed Doherty, editor of the New Rockford Transcript, 
commented on the coincidence that Eleanor Roosevelt and 
Walter Reuther were outspoken against former Dictator 
Batista simply because he was a despot, but now favored 
Castro--another dictator. Why oppose a dictator who was at 
least a pro-American and now support one who was pro- 
communist?̂ --*- The editor of the Casselton Reporter ex­
pressed his unhappiness over the thought that the United 
States had for years subsidized Cuban sugar and given her 
millions in foreign aid; this money was now being used to 
finance Cuban embassies throughout Latin America from which 
the Kremlin "directs a deadly stream of communist propa­
ganda and intrigue .
In a letter to the editor, George H. Perry of Sioux 
Palls, South Dakota, said that President Kennedy should 
send the marines into Cuba to restore democratic govern­
ment. "It seems to me that we have to make a start some­
where," he said, "and where could be better than 90 miles 
from our shores." The Argus Leader did not agree; in its 
opinion: "To say that we must go to war is to say that
^ Bismarck Tribune, May 11, 1961, p. l±.
-̂-*-New Rockford Transcript, June 8, 1961, p. 2.
^ Casselton Reporter, April 28, 1961.
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virtual suicide is the only answer. Certainly there is a 
better fate than that in store for mankind, and I like to 
believe we can achieve it through the exercise of our best 
intelligence.''̂4-3 "The idea that it is all right for the 
United States to impose its will upon smaller nations," 
said the Mandan Pioneer, "is untenable. America must be 
true to herself, being committed to a concept that people 
must work out their own destinies." A later issue com­
mented: "We must certainly shun, except in the most ex­
treme emergency, any action that would damage our world 
position as a champion of freedom, dedicated to the attain­
ment of an orderly, peaceful w o r l d . I n  reviewing the 
invasion, General Douglas MacArthur stated that Cuba was 
no mortal threat to the United States, and that we must 
now wait until the people of Cuba worked out their own 
salvat ion
The Mankato Free Press offered good advice: "The 
policy of staying out of other people's affairs should be 
basic to our policy." Commenting also on the value of an 
informed public, the Press stated that it was the American 
people who finally determined national policy, by knowing 
fully what their government representatives wanted to do.
^ gjoux Falls Argus Leader, May 1, 1961, p. I±.
^ Mandan Pioneer, May 1+, 1961, p. i|, and May 2$,
1961, p. i*..
-̂3>Grand Forks Herald, May 2, 1961, p. I4..
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The public can not fulfill its role without being ade­
quately informed.^
In summary it seems clear, in spite of some voices. „ f
to the contrary, that there was little concern over the 
alleged Cuban communist threat that had become such an 
obsession with the national news media. Public opinion as 
expressed by the press in the Upper-Midwest, influenced 
perhaps by traditional isolationism, suggested a sane and 
sensible "hands-off" policy. It understood that this was 
a search on the part of the Cuban people for a better life 
and they had the right to carry on the struggle free from 
foreign interference.
^Mankato Free Press, April 29, 1961, p. 8.
CHAPTER V
Observations and Conclusions
The Bay of Pigs remains an ominous page in our his­
tory. The United States must postulate its acts on sounder 
grounds than it used to justify giving aid to this abortive 
invasion, and weigh more surely the consequences of such 
attempts and failures. Too much planning was centered on 
the military take over in Cuba with too little of it aimed 
toward the future. There has been too much concern with a 
negative anti-communism, not realizing that there may be 
other forms of government that may accomplish as much for 
the happiness and welfare of its people as a democracy.
The tragedy of the Bay of Pigs was not in the failure, ex­
cept for the lives lost, but in the attempt. The real 
question is not whether the Cubans could have won had all 
things gone well, but whether they could have fashioned a 
workable government had they succeeded. It is well never­
theless, to reflect on and learn the lessons taught by the 
failure.
Foreign policy in a large measure must be based on 
intelligence about other countries, including the friendly 
ones. The world has become so complicated that the Presi­
dent has neither the time nor the resources to do his own 
evaluating of this intelligence. Confronted with this
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problem, President Truman created the CIA when he estab­
lished the National Security Act of 19^7. He asserted that 
he conceived of the CIA primarily as "a co-ordinating and 
intelligence-gathering aid to a modern President who needed 
concise, centralized information on which to base national 
policy." By 1961 the intelligence apparatus had gone far 
beyond what Truman had anticipated. In criticism of this 
developement he stated:
I . . . would like to see the CIA restored to
its original assignment as the intelligence arm 
of the President. . . . There is something omi­
nous about the way the CIA has been functioning 
that is casting a shadow over our historical 
position and I feel that we need to correct it.
No agency should be permitted to operate without some form 
of independent, critical outside examination--an agency 
should not sit in judgment of itself. The CIA should be 
solely a body to gather intelligence, weigh it and inter­
pret it if required, but not to make policy decisions. In 
spite of the need to operate in secrecy, the organization 
must be placed under some surveilance; the administration, 
the Congress, as well as the public have a vested interest 
in what takes place. After the Cuban debacle suggestions 
were that the CIA be placed under the supervision of a 
Committee on Intelligence, or a bi-partisan commission from 
both House and Senate. There is no reason why secrets 
should leak in any greater degree from one formal committee
iRoss and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. 350-
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than from the present group of informal sub-committees.
Ross and Wise pointed out that there has not been any leak 
of classified data from the Joint Committee on Atomic Ener-
i
gy, or other such committees under surveilance.2
There are inherent weaknesses in our system of govern­
ment. They can be strong only when each department per­
forms its functions completely, yet staying completely 
within its prescribed limits. The President must make him­
self the final arbiter in the decison making process. He 
must understand that the bureaucracy under him can supply 
intelligence, but may not itself be intelligent. He must 
remain independent from the collective thinking of his ad­
visors, listen to their judgments but retire into himself 
to make the final judgment--not even allowing his own 
deeper feelings to influence his decisions. The President 
carries an awesome responsibility.
Kennedy was faced with two alternatives; to stage an 
invasion of Cuba with American military support if neces­
sary, or to abandon the project completely. To avoid the 
risks which either course of action seemed to manifest, he 
chose a middle course, intervening just a little but not 
enough to assure success, and so reaped a harvest of crit­
icism that either course would have produced. Commentary 
suggests that this is the difference between a statesman 
and a politician: "The statesman must commit himself to
• J2lbid P- 355-
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a course of action to the exclusion of all others. He 
must cross the Rubicon or refrain from crossing it, he 
cannot have it both ways. A politician can equivocate be- 
tween different courses of action and bridge the chasm be­
tween incompatible positions by embracing them both."^ 
Wishful thinking substituting for intelligence led to a 
politician's choice. The lesson to be emphasized, overlook­
ing the right and wrong of the operation, is that the coun­
try's prestige and power should never be committed unless 
it is prepared to commit every resource, if need be, with 
but one thought--and that is to win. "There is no alter­
native," said General Eisenhower. "Force is a naked, bru­
tal thing in this world. If you are going to use it, you 
have got JsicQ to be prepared to go all the way."^
The Bay of Pigs demonstrated how virtually impossible 
it is, without wartime conditions of censorship, to conduct 
a secret operation of this magnitude and keep it secret in 
an open society. The press insists on its right to know 
and print what is happening in government. "One of the 
great strengths of democracy is its openness," said Sena­
tor Wayne Morse. "The right of the American people in the 
field of foreign policy is to be informed about proposed
^Hans Morgenthau, "The Trouble with Kennedy, " 
Commentary, January 1962, p. $1.
T̂J.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks of 
Hon. John W. Wydler, quoting from an article by Earl Mazo 
entitled, "Ike Speaks Out: Bay of Pigs was all J. F. K's." 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. ASb'iS-
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policies that may determine the difference between peace 
and war."^ In a free society attention should be given as 
well to the increasing tendency of the American Government 
to mislead the American people in its attempt to protect 
secret operations. In the U-2 incident, Linclon White, 
.State Department spokesman gave assurances that "there was 
absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air­
space. There never has been." A few days before the Cu­
ban Invasion, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said: "The Am­
erican people are entitled to know whether we are inter­
vening in Cuba or intend to do so in the near future. The
answer to that question is no. What happens in Cuba is for
/the Cuban people to decide."
Even had the invasion succeeded it is doubtful that 
it could have produced a viable political resolution to 
Cuba's problems. The concept of trying to put a right- 
wing government that would have been branded as a Yankee 
creation was dreadfully wrong. A government imposed from 
the outside is not a stable way of promoting and advancing 
the social and economic welfare of a people.
A larger lesson involves the total American reaction 
to the Cuban revolution. In a sense, the invasion plan was 
an extension of prevailing American attitudes to a revolu­
tionary change. For Cuba it was a rebellion against the
5u.S., Congressional Record, Senator Wayne Morse,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., 6580.
^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 275*
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past; a declaration of independence from American business 
interests, especially the sugar companies, so closely iden­
tified with the landlordism that was the basic complaint of
i
the landless peasantry. The American press overlooked or 
failed to understand these basic causes of the revolution.
Prom the time of the executions in Cuba in the early 
months of 1959, the American press, radio and television 
were emotionally and overwhelmingly hostile. Americans on 
the scene were more realistic and sympathetic. Brennan 
said: "The record shows plainly that, if any criminals de­
served being put to death the Cuban war criminals certainly 
did."7 David Binder, former president of the Harvard Law 
Record, reported:
The impression this observer received is that it 
is fair. The Cuban judicial system is founded 
upon the civil law, rather than the English com­
mon law. No jury is utilized. The war crimes 
trials are held before three judges in military 
tribunals. . . .  No judge is likely to vote for 
conviction if he has a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt.* 8
Victor Franco in The Morning After writes: "When you make
a revolution, you are obliged to kill. It is inevitable, 
otherwise the revolution would not take place at all. . .
The French Revolution went through the same phase.
Americans should reflect on the mass killing that took
7Bre nnan, Castro, Cuba and Justice, p. 279.
8Ibid., p. 277-
^victor Franco, The Morning After (New York: Fred­
erick A. Praeger, 1963T1 first published in France in 1962.
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place under Machado and Batista governments supported by
their country. Herbert Matthews stated:
No one who knew the extremes of barbarism to 
which the recent tortures in Cuba . . . have
gone, will be able to deny in conscience that 
the corrective methods must be extreme. . . .
If the Provisional Government does not exe­
cute the most noted criminals quickly, public 
passion will overflow, outraged at the im­
punity of the delay, and then the number of 
dead will be many, many thousands.10
Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin commented wisely that,
"People striving for economic betterment, political freedom,
and national independence sometimes use methods we abhor
or go to extremes we deem unwise. Even in such cases we
must uphold the principle of non-intervention." H
Once the label of communism was pinned on Fidel and 
his regime early in 1959? the hysteria that accompanied the 
American attitude toward communism worked its poison. Mat­
thews said this was due to a lack of understanding, and it 
was tragic because it contributed so much to the develop­
ing conflict between Cuba and the United States. In his 
opinion, it helped drive Fidel quicker and deeper into the 
communist embrace.^ It seemed to the London Observer that 
to "a far greater extent than they would like to admit, our 
American friends are the prisoners of an ideology almost as
l°Matthews, The Cuban Story, p. 292.
Hu.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks 
of Hon. Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin, 87th Cong. 1st. 
Sess. 6915'
■^Matthews, The Cuban Story, p. 285.
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narrow as that of the communists and just as fervently 
believed. The American ideology equates capitalism not 
only with freedom but very nearly with virtue."13
Had the United States accepted Castro's reforms and 
provided help in carrying out his program, it is likely that 
nationalization would have been limited to a few key mono­
polies such as oil, utilities and sugar mills, and if the 
owners had been willing to accept payment in keeping with 
Cuba's means to repay they would have been compensated. In 
the spring of I960 Castro came to the United States to seek 
loans and economic help. He was turned down and shortly 
thereafter the Eisenhower administration put into effect an 
economic blockade on Cuban trade. One retaliation led to 
another. When Cuba had to turn to Russia for crude oil, 
American refineries refused to handle it so the Cuban gov­
ernment took over the refineries. In July the United States 
cancelled the sugar quota expecting to cripple Cuban econ­
omy, but it was rescued by the purchase of sugar by com­
munist countries. On August 6 a large part of the Ameri­
can investments in Cuba were nationalized. Cuba again 
offered to pay if the United States would permit the sugar 
quota— the only means it had. On October 19th the United 
States placed an embargo on all exports to Cuba except 
medicines and certain foods. On October 25th Cuba
1^Huberman and Sweezy, Anatomy of a Revolution, p.
179; Light and Marzani, Cuba versus CIA, p. 67.
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nationalized all remaining American-owned companies.^
Before the revolution two thirds of Cuba's exports 
and three quarters of her imports were provided for in trade
i
with the United States, while trade with the socialist coun­
tries played only a small part. When, almost overnight this 
situation was reversed it created many problems. Many ad­
justments had to be made in the manner of handling goods, 
an entirely new system of handling and storage had to be de­
vised. Most of Cuba’s automobiles, machinery, etc. are Am­
erican made. The need for replacement parts poses a prob­
lem; some have to be bought from a third country that uses 
American equipment, some can be secured from the USSR, and 
in many cases new parts are made by Cubans themselves.
This imposes grave problems on Cuba, but once overcome it 
will undoubtedly work to her benefit--she will be free to 
plan and develope her own economy and resources.
A wave of criticism from the United States hit Castro 
because he did not set about establishing a permanent gov­
ernment under the 19^0 Constitution and hold elections. If 
such an election had been held Castro would have won it 
sweepingly--there was no opposition party. It would have 
been as much a farce as a Batista or a Machado election. 
Overlooked were meaningless elections in other Latin-Ameri- 
can countries.
Amid the frenzied cries of "communism" by sections of
^Ibid., p. 181.
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the United States press, television, and radio, certain ac­
complishments of the revolutionary government has been ig­
nored. Progress is infinitely slow, but if the United 
States will leave Cuba alone and stop its economic harass­
ment, the revolution will succeed. With United States help 
it could be a sweeping success.
Cuba is a dramatic specification of the general bank­
ruptcy of United States policies and lack of policies. It 
isn't only Cuba; it is all of Latin America coming out of 
its centuries-long isolation. A land enormously rich--in 
soil, timber, coal; it is rich in almost everything people 
need to live well. Yet, in these countries two thirds of 
the people live in unbelievable poverty.
Most of the Latin-American countries are run by an 
alliance of the military and foreign capital--largely 
United States capital. Foreign aid in the past has been 
mostly the giving of arms and other military support in the 
name of "hemispheric defense." Arms that have been used 
again and again to enslave the people of the countries that 
received them. In later years attempts have been made to 
help industralize these nations, but this has left the 
masses in as bad shape as ever. Too often the aim of the 
United States government has been to promote trade and 
protect investments by maintaining political stability 
among the dominated, irrespective of the form of government, 
in order that business might continue without interruption.
Most of the riches and resourses is now in foreign
Ilk
hands. United States must use its wealth; and its vast 
wealth of know-how to make it possible for Latin-American 
countries to control all its own resources, help them 
create their own capital and develope their own "skills." 
There is danger in the lack of people with skill and know­
ledge and sensibility. Education is needed and they do 
not have the professional people required in higher insti­
tutions of learning. If the United States is to "export" 
something, accomplished teachers will be of greatest help.
An expanded type of "peace corps," seems to provide the best 
answer. Fortunately the myth of Anglo-Saxon superiority 
has now been removed, but the hatred it engendered lives 
on. The challenge to all American greatness--North, Cen­
tral and South--is to bring into being a "hemispheric 
friendship." The United States, largely responsible for 
the hatred, must now provide the impetus for its eradica­
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